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To a large degree, DoD’s organization, processes, and workforce have all been inherited 
from a time when the United States faced a unique threat from the Soviet Union.  Today, 
this singular threat has been replaced by a series of distributed and complex threats (to 
include failed and failing states, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and 
growing threats from global terrorist organizations) that have proven far more difficult to 
satisfactorily address.  This volatile international security environment makes it difficult 
to project, with any level of confidence, the specific threats that the nation may face, even 
a short time from now.  Furthermore, additional environmental considerations such as 
rapidly changing technology, a wide array of new military operations, significant 
budgetary pressure, and many legislative and regulatory changes, all serve as added 
factors impacting the state of DoD acquisition and the members of its workforce. 
 
In this latter case, the impact of these considerations on the acquisition workforce has 
been significant—demanding new skills and acquisition strategies, as well as additional 
personnel to successfully meet the emergent challenges of the twenty-first century.  For 
example, changing technological and operational requirements, and decisions to 
outsource many non-inherently-governmental support services (such as many logistics 
support functions), have created additional acquisition workforce complexity, requiring 
members to have different skill-sets (e.g. more of a focus on management and oversight), 
and a wider knowledge-base to draw from.  Furthermore, emergent acquisition 
requirements have resulted in greater contractor support for the acquisition workforce.  
Recently, this support has been met with resistance, because of ambiguity in what work is 
considered to be “inherently governmental” and the potential for conflicts of interest.  As 
a result, there has been an emerging belief that many “contractor augmented” support 
services should be brought back in-house (using Federal employees) through the practice 
of “in-sourcing.”  However, this, too, has been highly controversial; raising issues of 
higher costs, less flexibility, required training, needed skills, etc. 
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At the same time, there has been a high demand for contingency contracting to support 
contingency operations, placing an additional burden on the acquisition workforce—often 
resulting in a shortage of qualified individuals, willing to accept the risks required for 
doing their current job in a hostile military environment.  Finally, the increased demand 
for workforce members to perform rapid acquisitions—to help military forces respond to 
quickly evolving asymmetric threats—places additional cost, schedule, and performance 
accountability burdens upon acquisition personnel.  Finally, during the post-Cold War 
period of the 90s, there was a dramatic drawdown of the acquisition workforce 
(corresponding to the reducing in the defense budget), but with the subsequent rapid 
build-up in the post 9/11 period there was not a corresponding build up in the acquisition 
workforce (in-fact, in the mid-90s, Congress mandated a 25 percent further reduction, 
which was not brought back after the budget build-up).  And this quantitative reduction 
was matched by a reduction in General Officers and SES acquisition positions.  When all 
these factors are taken into account, they contribute to a unique and complex environment 
for the current acquisition workforce.  In this context, the major elements of the 
acquisition workforce, the political appointees, military personnel and civilians, each 
encounter several challenges which make it difficult for them to successfully meet 
twenty-first century military requirements.  
 
Political appointees represent the most senior members of the acquisition community and 
they are charged with serving a wide-variety of roles, including managing members of 
the acquisition workforce, executing and interpreting DoD policy, and contributing 
directly to making program decisions.  In recent years, the confirmation process and 
qualifications necessary for political appointments have proven to be difficult 
impediments to recruiting and fulfilling staffing requirements for these highly important 
positions.  Furthermore, the ethics restrictions that are required of nominees are more 
stringent now than ever before, contributing to many potential nominees becoming 
hesitant to agree to their terms.  Finally, the introduction of waivers to circumvent 
minimum experience qualification standards for political appointments has also 
undermined the original intent of these requirements for senior political appointees. 
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In addition to political appointees, military members of the acquisition workforce provide 
an added point of accountability and unique perspectives, as warfighters themselves 
involved in the acquisition process.  Currently, the number of military acquisition 
personnel has been significantly reduced.  Furthermore, there has been a general lack of 
well-trained personnel fulfilling acquisition duties, such as those working in contingency 
contracting environments or serving as Contracting Officer Representatives (CORs).  We 
believe these factors have directly contributed to problems with effective management of 
DoD acquisition programs by adding additional burdens to civilian and contractor 
personnel, in addition to increasing the prospects for fraud, waste and abuse.   
 
Finally, civilian personnel represent the largest portion of the acquisition workforce.  
These members serve numerous roles in contracting, research and development, and 
program management.  Currently, major reductions in personnel (a decrease by almost 
half between 1989 and 1999); and, the aging of the workforce (in 2005 “Baby Boomers” 
and “Silent Generation” employees made up roughly 76 percent of acquisition personnel) 
have negatively impacted the current state of the civilian acquisition workforce (United 
States Government Accountability Office, 2002) (Undersecretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, 2007).  More specifically, these factors have contributed to: significant 
differences in workforce generations; a lack of technical skills and experience within the 
workforce; and, the emergence of career government employees with little or no 
industrial experience.   
 
Given the above-noted changes to the state of the acquisition environment and the 
workforce, we believe that the desired state of the acquisition workforce for the twenty-
first century should be one that centers on the concept of the “smart buyer.”  The “smart 
buyer” is one who is value focused, and has the requisite technical skills and experience 
to ensure the DoD is buying the proper systems and services, in the appropriate manner.  
To meet these requirements, we suggest that DoD’s acquisition workforce should: have 
stable leadership; be flexible; be technologically savvy; be focused on performance; gain 
broad-based experience; and, behave at the highest ethical level. 
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To achieve our vision for an acquisition workforce based upon the “smart buyer” model, 
DoD must overcome several challenges.  First, due to low pay, DoD will likely encounter 
difficulties in trying to retain high-caliber acquisition personnel.  In particular, we believe 
DoD will have difficulty retaining those who either have portable retirement benefits, or 
have already reached retirement service requirements.  Second, problems with 
recruitment often occur as a result of: a shrinking talent pool; the inability of potential 
candidates to meet citizenship (or security clearance) requirements; and, a highly 
inefficient application process.  Third, experience gaps are also detrimental to DoD’s 
modernization efforts as employees often do not have the right mix of skills needed to 
effectively function in the twenty-first century acquisition environment.  Fourth, a 
blended workforce (composed of military, civilian and contractor personnel) requires a 
unique approach to management, and presents a host of additional problems including: 
ambiguity in the definition of “inherently governmental” work that must be performed by 
DoD personnel; difficulty avoiding conflicts-of-interest; and, an incomplete view of the 
workforce’s composition (as reflected in policies and practices). 
 
In order to overcome these challenges to achieving an acquisition workforce 
transformation, we recommend the following initiatives be implemented DoD-wide: 
 
1. Increased stability for senior leadership.  To the degree possible, senior 
government leaders must ensure that there is program continuity, especially 
with key program leaders.  All possible actions should be taken, and 
incentives created, to ensure consistent program leadership by maintaining the 
stability of key personnel.   
2. Develop the required human capital.  In order to effectively develop the 
required human capital for the modern acquisition environment, we believe 
that DoD must: enhance recruitment by focusing on employing entry-
level/mid-level acquisition personnel through expanding internships and 
collaborative educational programs; accelerate efforts to streamline hiring 
processes; strive for achievement of a high-quality, not merely a high-
quantity, workforce; provide competitive wages, through revision of 
 viii
compensation packages to ensure current employees and potential hires are 
paid salaries comparable to the private sector; continue to undertake pilot 
programs to examine the benefits of incentivizing employees for improved 
performance; and, provide employees added incentives for additional training 
and education.  
3. Improve workforce agility.  To improve workforce agility, we believe DoD 
must: expand the use of rotational programs between Government, academia 
and industry; as well as, eliminate the disincentives for civilian workforce 
members to deploy (through additional financial compensation, the 
introduction of supplemental life-insurance and long-term-care benefits); as 
well as the introduction of pre-deployment training.   
4. Adapt to the blended workforce and partnering environment.  In order to 
effectively function within a blended workforce and government/industry 
partnering environment, we believe DoD must: clearly identify “inherently 
governmental” by critically examining the current use of definitions such as 
those proposed in the draft Office of Management and Budget, Office of 
Federal Procurement Policy Memo of March 31, 20101 (which we believe to 
be too broad, by including work that is in support of inherently-governmental 
functions, and work that is “critical”—since all work could be easily 
interpreted as fitting into this category).  Additionally, we believe DoD must 
continue to develop approaches to eliminate organizational and personal 
conflicts-of-interest.   
The current state of the acquisition workforce is undeniably inadequate to meet the 
demands of twenty-first century national security requirements.  We firmly believe that 
through implementation of our recommendations, the acquisition workforce can be 
successfully transformed to one which is composed of highly capable, “smart-buyers.”  
This must be viewed as one of DoD’s top priorities—the nation’s security depends on it.   
                                                 
1 A draft memo was recently published by the Office of Management and Budget, Office of Federal 
Procurement Policy in the Federal Register: March 31, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 61) and was titled 
“Work Reserved for Performance by Federal Government Employees.” 
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I. Introduction. 
The Department of Defense (DoD) is the single largest buyer in the world, spending 
approximately $393.5 billion, in FY 2008, for a range of goods and services to meet their 
mission requirements (United States Department of Defense, 2009).  While some of this 
spending is for goods and services, such as laptops, fuel oil, and food stuffs that are 
readily available and can be purchased from the commercial marketplace, there are also 
acquisitions for specialized systems, such as jet fighters, precision munitions, and nuclear 
submarines.  And, increasingly, many of the acquisitions now are for complex services.  
These myriad acquisitions are managed by DoD’s acquisition workforce.  This 
acquisition workforce is composed of not only contracting and procurement specialists, 
but also of all the employees that form the total acquisition team—from those that help 
develop requirements, to those that manage programs, and, oversee contractor 
performance.   
DoD, however, has experienced chronic shortages of suitably skilled acquisition 
personnel as spending and contract actions have increased substantially since 9/11/2001.2  
The root cause of the current shortages found within the DoD acquisition workforce can 
be traced to the end of the Cold War, when the United States was left with an excess 
capacity, of both industrial production and civilian/military personnel.  In response, the 
government took measures to downsize both the defense industry, as well as the defense 
acquisition workforce during the 1990’s.  With the changing threat environment, and 
increased operational requirements of the post 9/11 world, a significant mismatch 
between the demands placed on the acquisition workforce, and the personnel and skills 
available within that workforce to meet those demands, quickly developed.  This is 
shown clearly by the data in Figure 1. 
 
                                                 
2 Examples of historical studies undertaken in the 1950’s which highlighted such technical and acquisition 
workforce shortfalls include the Cordiner Committee study of the entire defense establishment and the 
Ridenour and Stever Committee studies of Air Force Research and Development.  More recently, well 
known reports that cite such deficiencies include the Packard Commission report from 1986 and the Report 





































DoD Procurement Budget Acquisition  
Figure 1. Decline in Acquisition Workforce and Increased Defense Spending (Commission on Army 
Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, 2007) 
 
One solution adopted by the DoD to augment the declining organic capacities was to hire 
contractors to support the acquisition functions, creating an increased dependence on 
contractor support.  This produced yet another set of challenges for the acquisition 
workforce; how best to mange a blended workforce and the new partnering relationships.   
In its current state, DoD’s acquisition workforce is not optimally structured to meet the 
nation’s twenty-first century security challenges.  As DoD seeks to rebuild its acquisition 
workforce (performing the inherently-governmental functions e.g. contracting, 
management, oversight, budgeting etc.), it faces several barriers that include difficulties 
in recruiting and retaining new employees, the wave of retiring workers, significant gaps 
in existing employee experience and credentials, along with the added challenges of 
management in a “blended” workforce environment.  These barriers have created major 
roadblocks for senior DoD leadership, as they work to develop an acquisition workforce 
that meets twenty-first century requirements.  
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Roadmap. 
This report will examine the state of the acquisition environment, detail requirements for 
the acquisition workforce, note challenges to modernization, and make definitive 
recommendations for meeting these challenges.  More specifically, Section Two will 
examine the state of the acquisition environment in the twenty-first century, and include a 
discussion of the impacts on acquisition due to rapidly changing technology, supporting 
current military operations, severe budgetary pressures, and legislative and regulatory 
changes.  Section Three of this report will briefly examine each component of the 
acquisition workforce, including: politically appointed personnel; military personnel; and, 
civilian personnel.  Section Four will highlight desired characteristics we believe are 
necessary for the acquisition workforce to possess in order to become “smart buyers” for 
the twenty-first century.  Section Five will review the challenges likely faced during the 
course of acquisition workforce modernization.  Section Six will provide a series of 
recommendations we believe will assist DoD in effectively modernizing its acquisition 
workforce.  Finally, Section Seven will provide concluding remarks. 
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II. Acquisition Environment for the Twenty-First Century.  
Of all the changes that have taken place, the one with the greatest influence on the 
acquisition environment in the twenty-first century is the reorientation of the international 
security environment.  In the 20 years since the Berlin Wall fell, the monolithic threat 
posed by the Soviet Union has been replaced by distributed and complex threats that have 
proved far more difficult to satisfactorily address.  These threats include those arising 
from failed and failing states (which have resulted in civil wars, regional instability and 
humanitarian catastrophes), the growing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; 
and expanding threats from global terrorist organizations.  This volatile international 
security environment makes it difficult to project, with any level of confidence, the 
precise threats that the nation may face even five years from now.   
As a result, the current environment is highly unpredictable.  Future operations may 
include activity against global terrorist networks; preparations for potential peer or near-
peer competitors, such as China, India, or Russia; missions related to maintaining 
security against weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including the pursuit of rogue 
nuclear states such as North Korea and Iran; and, finally, non-traditional national security 
challenges such as global pandemics, pirates in critical sea-lanes, natural disasters or 
energy security dilemmas which could require DoD intervention.  In response, DoD has 
shifted from threat-based planning to an alternative approach centered on capability-
based planning.  Capability-based planning is believed to provide a more rational basis 
for making decisions on future acquisitions—making planning more responsive to 
uncertainty.  The impact of these changes on the acquisition workforce has been 
significant, demanding new skills and additional personnel as the workforce must 
function in an environment with rapidly changing technology, a wide array of new 
military operations, considerable budgetary pressure, and many legislative and regulatory 
changes.  These factors will be discussed briefly in the following pages. 
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Rapidly Changing Technology. 
In 1965, Gordon Moore had observed that the complexity of semiconductor components 
had doubled each year since the first prototype microchip was produced in 1959, and 
projected that the number of components per integrated circuit would continue to double 
approximately every two years.  Over forty years later, despite skepticism that this trend 
would continue, the transistor counts exceed a few hundred million for logic chips, and 
even more for memory chips.  Some have used Moore’s Law to describe the exponential 
growth of technology in general.  In addition, the controlling and embedded software for 
these technologies continue to evolve on 12-18 month cycles, demanding a much more 
technically competent acquisition workforce than ever before.  This trend of accelerating 
technological change will continue to have a critical impact on warfighting and weapon 
systems, as the military develops applications based on these new developments, 
including: advanced information technologies, quantum computing, nano-technologies, 
bio-technologies, and robotics.  The acquisition workforce will be tasked with 
maintaining the agility to acquire a wide variety of systems capitalizing on these 
technologies. 
Further, in an effort to leverage the advances of the information revolution, DoD adopted 
a doctrine of “net-centric warfare.”  The goal was to use extensive systems networking 
from widely-distributed “sensors to shooters,” creating shared situational awareness and 
thereby enabling collaboration and improved speed of command.  This networking led to 
the need for greater and greater integration and interoperability, in the form of “system of 
systems” (SoS) development.  These systems-of-systems included individual weapon 
systems that have been bundled together as part of a larger, over-arching system 
architecture—creating a capability, which when combined, is greater than that of each 
individual component.  The impact of these advancements on the requirements placed on 
the acquisition workforce is significant, as DoD must now place a premium on those 
workforce members with the advanced technical skills to develop these complex SoS. 
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Supporting Current Military Operations. 
In addition to technology changes, DoD continues to support high-operations-tempo 
military operations globally.  Current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate the 
challenges American forces face while undertaking multiple military operations 
simultaneously.  These operations require significant numbers of contractor personnel to 
provide various types of in-theater support.  For example, in 2007 there were about 
270,000 contractors in the Iraq/Afghanistan theaters (more than 50 percent of the total 
force) (Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary 
Operations 2007).  The expanded use of contractors for these operations creates 
additional management responsibilities for DoD’s acquisition workforce, since they must 
oversee the performance of numerous contracts in the contingency environment. 
 
In addition, the different climate and terrain profiles of Iraq and Afghanistan highlight 
how the military must be prepared to operate in a variety of different environments—
each of which will require their own unique types of support from the acquisition 
community.  To this end, current operations in Iraq, which are primarily urban in nature, 
require a very different force structure and operational capability than missions in 
Afghanistan, which are being conducted in rugged, mountainous terrain and extreme 
weather conditions.  Besides operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, we believe future 
operations will also be incredibly diverse, as exemplified by recent U.S. military 
involvement with humanitarian operations in Haiti.  
 
As a result of these wide-ranging missions and operations, DoD’s acquisition 
environment has become significantly more complex.  For the acquisition workforce, this 
complexity means that there is a now a high demand for individuals with a diverse set of 
skills and experience (such as experience with traditional military operations, as well as 
reconstruction, and humanitarian efforts) to support the wide array of potential military 
operations likely to be faced by U.S. forces in the future.  The differences in these types 
of missions cannot be ignored, as the types of goods and services being acquired may 
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vary greatly. Consequently, the workforce must have the appropriate competencies to 
successfully meet DoD’s evolving operational requirements. 
 
Severe Budgetary Pressures. 
An additional complicating factor in today’s acquisition environment is the likely near-
term projection of severe budgetary pressures.  The United States faces several long-term 
budgetary challenges.  The rapidly-increasing financial burden as “Baby Boomers” age 
(by 2020 the number of people in the U.S. population between the ages of 65-84 is 
expected to rise by nearly 50 percent) includes mandatory federal entitlement spending 
on programs such as Social Security and Medicare, as well as the impact of the recent 
healthcare reform bill.  For example, during the next eight years, annual growth rates for 
Social Security and Medicare/Medicaid are expected to rise by roughly 4.5 to 6.5 percent, 
and 7 to 8 percent respectively (Congressional Budget Office, 2007).  Spending on these 
programs is directly tied to rising cost-of-living and healthcare costs in the United States; 
and, has historically outpaced defense spending as a percent of GDP.  Compounding this 
budgetary problem will be the payments on the national debt, accumulated during the 
economic collapse of the past decade.  These challenges, and the impact they will have 
on the domestic economy, will directly influence DoD’s future budgets.     
Additionally, the DoD has come to rely on large wartime “supplemental” budgets; which 
will likely be eliminated or, at a minimum, significantly reduced in years to come.  
Finally, a sizable portion of “defense discretionary” spending is not available, since it is 
already earmarked for future requirements, including the rising costs of compensation for 
military personnel, military health care, and facility modernization programs (Defense 
Science Board, 2005).   
When combined, these pressures place an immense burden on the workforce to overcome 
the gaps that will likely exist between available funding and DoD’s twenty-first century 
operational requirements, and will create an inevitable downward pressure on future DoD 
budgets.  This will serve to limit the funds available for recapitalization, modernization, 
and transformation of the military; imposing severe fiscal constraints on the acquisition 
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environment.  The potential severity of these pressures has been widely noted, with 
special attention being paid to the discrepancy between DoD requirements and available 
funding—an issue that could become one of the single largest problems faced by the 
Department in years to come (Gates 2010).  This will place a premium on knowledge in 
areas such as business management and best-value decision-making, within the ranks of 
the acquisition workforce, to mitigate the impact of these budgetary pressures.   
Legislative and Regulatory Changes. 
Acquisition within DoD has evolved over time as numerous legislative and regulatory 
changes have impacted DoD as an organization, its workforce, and its processes for the 
acquisition of goods and services.  Below, we highlight some of the most important 
legislative and regulatory changes influencing the current state of the acquisition 
environment. 
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. 
A significant legislative change impacting DoD personnel and the acquisition workforce 
was the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, 
commonly referred to as the Goldwater-Nichols Act.  This act was responsible for the 
reorganization of the Defense Department, creating a new emphasis on joint operations.  
Moreover, the Act created the new position of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(VCJCS), who acts as the Chairman, when the Chairman is absent.  Moreover, the 
VCJCS plays a significant role in the acquisition process, as the Chairman of the Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), and as the Vice Chairman of the Defense 
Acquisition Board.  The motivation behind the passing of Goldwater-Nichols was to 
combat the decades of inter-service rivalry that had plagued DoD for some time (Locher, 
2002).  As related to the acquisition workforce, Goldwater-Nichols assigned full 
responsibility for all acquisition activities to the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition and altered the roles and responsibilities of those military members of the 
acquisition workforce that require political appointments, while paving the way for joint 
acquisition programs. 
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Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA). 
Perhaps considered to be the most significant legislative change impacting the education 
and training of DoD’s acquisition personnel, the Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act, or DAWIA, was passed in 1990 and required the DoD to establish 
education and training standards, requirements, and courses for the civilian and military 
acquisition workforce.  This measure was primarily enacted due to several reviews 
(including the Packard Commission) that highlighted deficiencies in the technical skills 
and training of the acquisition workforce.  The Act also created certification standards, at 
three levels, for each of the thirteen acquisition career fields (Defense Acquisition 
University 2009).   
The introduction of DAWIA has had a significant impact on DoD’s acquisition 
personnel, as they are now required to participate in a structured educational program in 
order to achieve career advancement.  One of the noted drawbacks, however, of such an 
approach is the potential that it may limit the ability for employees to diversify their 
experiences; since the requirements for advancement are stringent and include specific 
service requirements for working in a particular job field.  These restrictions make it 
difficult for employees to cross-train and to gain experience beyond a lone core-
competency. 
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA). 
Passed in 1994, FASA served as a major turning point in acquisition legislation that now 
formally required the Secretary of Defense to approve or define the cost, performance, 
and schedule goals for major defense acquisition programs of the Department of Defense 
and for each phase of the acquisition cycle of such programs.  Furthermore FASA 
mandated that some 90 percent of those goals must be met.  One example of performance 
requirements of the legislation was the establishment of pilot acquisition programs for the 
purposes of evaluating changes in the way the acquisition of new goods and services are 
undertaken.   Examples of successful performance-based acquisition programs include 
joint direct-attack munitions (JDAM), commercially-derived aircraft and engines, and a 
fire-support tactical trainer (Grasso, 2000). 
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Such changes in policy were based on a desire by DoD to decrease costs for doing 
business through the expanded use of commercial practices and a reduction in the 
existing bureaucracy.  Specific requirements of the legislation included: a move to 
increase the use of commercial-off-the-shelf products (COTS); streamlined processes for 
making COTS purchases; raising the threshold for numerous defense procurement 
statutes to $100,000; streamlining the bid-protest process; raising the cap for specialized 
accounting requirements to $500,000; raising the cap to $100,000 for contracts that could 
be reserved for small businesses; and the creation of unified procurement statutes for 
executive branch agencies (Grasso, 2000). 
As a result of FASA, a new focus on cost, schedule, and performance requires acquisition 
personnel to possess additional business, accounting and economic skills.  Furthermore, 
the acquisition workforce must realign its attention to identifying commercial best 
practices; a feat that can be difficult for those workforce members with little or no 
experience in the private sector. 
Federal Acquisition Reform Act. 
Following the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act, an effort to add additional reforms 
was undertaken with the Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA) which sought to 
improve competition for commercial products, while preserving “full and open” 
competition, and reduce barriers to the acquisition of commercial goods.  Additionally, 
the Act further streamlined bid-protest processes, by allowing the GAO to serve as the 
mediating party.  In anticipation of the success of such reforms, on efforts to streamline 
acquisition functions, the Act further reduced DoD’s acquisition workforce by 15,000 
while advising DoD to seek additional reductions in the near future3 (Grasso, 2000).   
The introduction of the Federal Acquisition Reform Act placed additional burdens on the 
acquisition workforce, due to decreases in manpower and capabilities; resulting in the 
potential that some important personnel resources would no longer be available.  As was 
later experienced, immediately following 9/11 and during the military operations in Iraq 
                                                 
3 Additional workforce reductions were included as requirements in several subsequent Defense 
Authorization Acts. 
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and Afghanistan, the impact of these personnel reductions became significant as 
contracting actions and dollars spent increased significantly, without a commensurate 
increase in the acquisition workforce. 
Performance-based contracting requirements. 
Performance-based services acquisition (PBSA) is the use of performance-based 
contracting for the acquisition of services, and has recently been the focal point of several 
initiatives to improve the quality of professional services provided to the DoD.  One such 
initiative was the DoD’s Undersecretary of Acquisition, Technology and Logistics’ 
memo on Performance Based Service Acquisition from April 5, 2000.  This memo 
required DoD to establish, at a minimum, by 2005, that 50 percent of all contracting 
dollars spent and actions for service contracts were to be performance-based 
(Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics, 2000).   
PBSA “involves acquisition strategies, methods, and techniques that describe and 
communicate measurable outcomes, rather than to direct compliance with performance 
processes.”  PBSA is a method for acquiring what is required, and placing the 
responsibility for how it is accomplished on the contractor (The Office of the Deputy 
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Reform), 2000).  The purpose of PBSA is for 
the government to adopt best commercial contracting practices, so as to take advantage of 
the enormous private market potential to deliver superior performance at a low cost 
(Gansler, 2010).  This reform effort has impacted the types of skills that must be held by 
acquisition employees.  For the effective implementation of PBSA, acquisition workforce 
personnel must now be more familiar with performance-based metrics, requirements 
planning, and effective oversight and monitoring techniques for evaluating contractor 
performance—in order to ensure performance targets and contractual requirements are 
met. 
Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009. 
The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 was passed for the purpose of 
reforming acquisitions of expensive, highly-technical systems-of-systems, and has 
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significant implications for the roles and responsibilities of the acquisition workforce, 
moving forward.  The Act seeks to promote early-stage systems engineering analysis, 
during the development cycle, by the Services themselves (currently, in some cases this 
analysis is being conducted by contractors).  Furthermore, the Act sets strict guidelines 
for terminating programs that run 25 percent over budget, or greater (unless a national 
security exception can be made).  The reform measure also creates additional senior-level 
positions within DoD’s acquisition workforce; including the Director of Independent 
Cost Assessment and the Director of Developmental Test and Evaluation.  Lastly, the Act 
specifically requires that the Secretary of Defense take measures to ensure that “trade-
offs between cost, schedule, and performance are considered as part of the process for 
developing requirements for major weapon systems” (Benson, 2009).  The implications 
of the reforms presented in this Act are significant for the acquisition workforce, as they 
highlight the new focus within the Department on ensuring best-value decisions are 
made, while stipulating an additional in-house requirement for monitoring research and 
development progress.  Such reforms will also demand increased levels of technical 
competency from members of the acquisition workforce. 
Impacts on DoD Acquisition. 
These changes have all impacted the nature of DoD acquisition.  DoD is now buying 
more services than hardware; there has been a rise of “contractor augmentation,”4 later 
followed by an “in-sourcing” initiative; a greater focus on contingency contracting; and, 
the emergence of rapid response and streamlined acquisition processes.   
 
 
DoD buying more services than hardware. 
                                                 
4 For the purposes of this report “contractor augmentation” will be defined as those contractors that were 
hired to provide support services to the acquisition workforce following downsizing during the 1990’s and 
2000’s. 
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Due to changing technological and operational requirements, and decisions to outsource 
many support services (such as many logistics support functions), DoD has shifted a 
majority of its purchases from goods to services.  Historically, the acquisition of goods 
had served as the major function of the acquisition workforce.  Recently however, not 
only have services composed a greater proportion of DoD’s spending overall, but 
spending on services has continued to increase.  In FY2005 for example, DoD obligated 
more than $141 B on service contracts – a 72 percent increase from FY1999 (Acquisition 
Advisory Panel, 2007).  Spending on services continued to steadily increase as DoD 
spent roughly $201.88 B in FY2008, (a little more than half of all its spending on goods 
and services.).  Not only has DoD increased its spending on services consistently over the 
past decade, but spending on services has also consistently outpaced spending on goods 
during this period as well. 
The growth of service contracts in recent years can be partially traced to increased 
support requirements following 9/11, in addition to the deployment of military personnel 
to Iraq and Afghanistan.  As a result of military downsizing after the Cold War, many 
logistics support functions (which had been previously accomplished by DoD personnel) 
are now provided by contractors.  For example in 2009, estimated support contractors in 
Iraq and Afghanistan were numbered at over 240,000, with about 80 percent of them 
being foreign nationals.  Further, as of June 2009 some 1,360 of these support contractors 
have died in the war zones (Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, 2009). 
Another contributing factor to the increase in services is DoD’s shift from buying goods 
for the in-house provision of a function by the military or DoD civilians, to a model, 
focused on purchasing the requisite the service from a contractor instead.  In addition to 
being cost effective, this approach also provides added flexibility, because operations and 
maintenance funding can be used, as opposed to procurement funding.  One example of 
this phenomenon is the Evolved Expendable Launch vehicle program; where the Air 
Force has the ability to purchase rocket launch services from private contractors, instead 
of seeking to purchase rockets and manage launches themselves.  This shift has moved 
the purchase of capabilities like this from being classified as “goods purchases” to 
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“service purchases.”  Another example of this practice is the purchase of simulator 
training services (being done because of the difficulties in modernizing existing simulator 
hardware and software for both the Army and Air Force).  In this case, instead of 
purchasing the simulators themselves, the two branches now purchase training services 
from outside providers (Hutton, 2007).  
The impact of the increase in service contracts for the acquisition workforce is 
significant, as service contracts are often more complex than those for goods.  Due to this 
added complexity, DoD’s acquisition workforce is now required to have very different 
skill-sets and a wider knowledge-base to draw from.  For example, because service 
contracts have different types of deliverables than do contracts for goods, acquisition 
personnel must have an understanding of how these contracts function, how they should 
be managed, and service-specific information for the type and quantity of services being 
acquired.  Major differences in the acquisition of services from goods include the need 
for performance accountability, accurate estimates of level of efforts versus volume of 
materials, as well as intangible issues that may arise when dealing with people and 
contractual or legal matters that vary significantly between purchases of goods and 
services (such as the type of language that is used in the contract to describe the service 
being purchased).  Further, the importance of acquiring services competitively (and 
ensuring the workforce has the requisite skills to do so) cannot be stressed enough.  
Moving forward, the Department has undertaken several initiatives to increase the levels 
of competition, and it will be dependent upon the skills of its workforce to effectively 
manage these contract awards--to ensure that the rewards of competitive acquisitions can 
be harnessed.  
The added complexity of acquiring services, within the context of a downsized 
workforce, has created an environment where acquisition personnel are often struggling 
to meet the needs of the twenty-first century.  To paraphrase recent testimony by John 
Hutton on the matter: recently, it has become incredibly difficult for DoD to maintain a 
workforce with the required knowledge of market conditions, industry trends, and the 
technical information about the services they procure; the ability to prepare clear 
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statements of work; and the capacity to manage and supervise an increasing number of 
contractors (Hutton, 2007).  
”Contractor Augmentation.” 
Following the downsizing of the acquisition workforce, new acquisition requirements 
emerged that stretched DoD’s capacity.  The added pressure of increased operational 
requirements, along with spending and contract actions increases, resulted in a major 
push toward contractor augmentation for the acquisition workforce.  By using contractors 
to augment the acquisition workforce, DoD was able to obtain the required services.  The 
impact, however, of acquiring these services from contractors includes the appearance 
and possibility (if not carefully controlled) of contractors performing “inherently 
governmental” functions; as well the potential for conflicts-of-interest. 
While the acquisition workforce has been able to use contractors to provide some 
additional support, the execution of several functions which have, in some cases, come 
close to “inherently governmental,” and have led many inside and outside of DoD to 
question whether the benefit of using contractors, outweighs the potential risks.  For 
example, in some cases, these contractors have been tasked with preparing statements of 
work, managing acquisition plans, and even drawing up contracting documents; because 
DoD’s previous capacity reductions, in some cases made the performance of such 
functions with in-house resources difficult (Brodsky, 2008).  Thus, real concern has 
emerged, in instances where contractors have been hired to support government 
acquisition personnel without proper management and oversight, of how they are 
performing and what tasks they may be undertaking (Kaplan 2008).  
“In-sourcing.”  
Recently, there also has been a push—primarily initiated by the new Presidential 
administration—to bring many “contractor augmented” support services back in-house, 
using Federal employees, through so-called “in-sourcing.”5  The logic behind such a 
                                                 
5 For the FY2011 budget, Defense Secretary Robert Gates is seeking a $79 million hike in civilian pay and 
benefits for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, including “$42.6 million from internal in-sourcing 
actions that generate projected savings of $26 million” (Inside Defense 2010).  
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movement is that reducing the dependence on contractors to perform acquisition-related 
functions would have government employees performing “inherently governmental” 
functions, reduce conflicts of interest, and (they believe) also reduce the costs of 
performing these functions, since government employees generally earn less than 
contractors (although the total cost of government civilians is generally widely under–
estimated—as numerous studies e.g. by GAO, CBO, etc. have shown).  Moreover, there 
is the belief that DoD civilians would provide better oversight, helping to ensure that 
contractors properly fulfill their contractual obligations.   
To initially fulfill this “in-sourcing” initiative, DoD will convert roughly 11,000 
contractor support positions back into DoD civilian employee positions, as part of a 
larger strategy to expand its acquisition workforce by 15 percent, or 20,000 employees, 
through fiscal year 2015.  Further, it is believed such a strategy will contribute to 
effectively providing oversight against fraud, waste, and abuse that has significantly 
appeared to have increased in contracting in the war-zone;, in-part, due to a belief in a 
lack of government management and oversight (Assad, 2009).   
The positive impact of “in-sourcing” on the acquisition workforce could be significant if 
“in-sourcing” is undertaken in a strategic manner, for the purposes of reducing the 
recognized shortages within the acquisition workforce; and if it is achieved with 
employees with the needed skills and for “inherently governmental” positions.  However, 
if “in-sourcing” is viewed as strictly a requirement to meet numerical goals, and care isn’t 
taken to hire the best-qualified individuals with the required skills, the potential benefits 
of “in-sourcing” will be significantly reduced and are likely to actually be negative (in 




Another impact of changing military operational requirements in the modern acquisition 
environment is the high demand for contingency contracting, which places an additional 
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burden on the acquisition workforce.  Contingency contracting can be defined as those 
contracting efforts that are required as the result of military operations, and demand 
contracting support in-theater, usually overseas, and often within close proximity to the 
war-zone itself.   
Today’s contingency contracting is unlike anything that was undertaken in previous 
military operations, particularly as a result of the downsizing of the military’s service 
support units during the 1990’s; in addition to the unpredictable nature of these conflicts 
(including unknown timelines and difficulty of post-conflict reconstruction efforts).  The 
military has, as a result, turned to the private sector for the “surge” provision of major 
support services for its troops in-theater, requiring a major presence of acquisition 
professionals to oversee and manage these services (Carafano, 2009). 
As explained by the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in 
Expeditionary Operations (commonly known as the Gansler Commission), warfare in the 
future is likely to be expeditionary and likely to involve high numbers of contractor 
personnel.  The Commission noted that the military has currently been stretched thin, 
and, as a result, has widely used contractors for the provision of support services.  
Despite these changes, the necessary oversight and management of contractor activities 
must be maintained within the expeditionary contracting environment, and that requires 
DoD contracting personnel on-site (Commission on Army Acquisition and Program 
Management in Expeditionary Operations, 2007). 
As further noted by the Gansler Commission, in 2007 over half of the personnel in Iraq 
and Afghanistan were contract employees.  This puts enormous pressure upon Army 
acquisition personnel and, specifically, those members in the contracting field who 
participate in writing, negotiating, monitoring, and maintaining accountability for the 
contracts (Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary 
Operations, 2007). 
Because of the rise of service contracts and the needed focus on contingency contracting, 
DoD contingency contracting personnel are required in-theater, for the purpose of 
managing support contracts.  An added complication is the fact that DoD is prohibited 
 18
from requiring government civilian personnel to serve in these war-zone positions; and, 
consequently, must ask for volunteers.  This often results in a shortage of qualified 
individuals willing to accept the risks required for doing their current job in a hostile 
military environment.  As a consequence, those members of the acquisition workforce 
who do choose to volunteer are often overworked and turnover rates can be incredibly 
high, only further negatively impacting acquisition outcomes in-theater.   
In addition to the obvious physical risks and additional pressures endured by acquisition 
personnel, contingency contracting efforts directly impact the acquisition workforce as 
these situations may demand special skills that are not required when contracting 
personnel are performing their duties under normal circumstances.  For example, in a 
contingency environment, besides the need for expedited treatment, much of the work 
may be paper-based, as access to information technology is often limited.  In this case, 
personnel may have to creatively devise methods for oversight and management of 
contractor performance which are relatively different from traditional contractor 
management and oversight processes6.  
Streamlined/rapid response acquisition. 
A final impact of the current environment is the increased demand for the acquisition 
workforce to perform streamlined or rapid acquisitions, to help military forces respond to 
rapidly-evolving asymmetric threats.  This approach is designed to move outside of the 
traditional acquisition process to one that is designed specifically for the purposes of 
creating immediate solutions to warfighter problems and has thus far yielded mixed 
results.  The requirements, known as Immediate Warfighter Needs (IWNs), are ones 
which have been a center of attention for streamlined acquisition efforts.  An IWN is 
defined as an Urgent Operational Need (UON) that must be addressed within 120 days or 
less, and, if left unfulfilled, could result in loss of life or prevent the successful 
completion of a near-term military mission.  Rapid acquisition for the purposes of 
supporting a UON or IWN is very different from the traditional acquisition process as it 
                                                 
6 In response to the Gansler Commission report, the Army established (in 2009) the Army Contracting 
Command, with an Expeditionary component. This action is intended to specifically address the problems 
described above. 
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has been streamlined to increase efficiency (Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, 2006-2007).  
Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) serve as a prime example of a major IWN that has 
been addressed using streamlined acquisition.  
Streamlined, or rapid-response, acquisition places additional cost, schedule, and 
performance accountability burdens upon acquisition personnel; and, in some cases 
increases their powers of authority for the purposes of reducing bureaucratic red tape.  
Members of the acquisition workforce, participating in a streamlined, or rapid-response 
acquisition effort, must be highly competent and aware of the impact of their decisions, 
which, if made incorrectly, may directly contribute to loss of life or mission failure.   
In the case of the DoD’s effort to quickly acquire vehicles that would be resistant to 
IED’s, a rapid acquisition effort was undertaken to procure Mine Resistant Ambush 
Protected (MRAP) vehicles.  The MRAP program began in February 2007, using a 
tailored acquisition approach to rapidly acquire and field the vehicles.  An aggressive 
production schedule began in February 2007, with one vendor producing 10 vehicles.  By 
March 2008, just over a year after the initial contracts were awarded, 6,935 vehicles had 
been produced (Sullivan, 2009).  
To date, the MRAP has been credited with saving countless lives and contributing 
directly to an alteration in tactics by insurgents.  As the MRAPs are capable of 
withstanding many types of IED’s, insurgents have been less successful in taking 
American lives.  As of 2008, IED attacks accounted for some 40 percent of all attacks on 
Coalition forces in Iraq; however, this number is significantly lower than previous levels 
and has continued to fall.  For example, the overall number of IED incidents in 
September 2008 was about 33 percent of the total from September 2007, and only 22 
percent of the total number of incidents from September 2006—a sure sign of 
improvement (Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, 2009).  The 
MRAP example highlights the power that acquisition personnel have during streamlined 
acquisition or rapid acquisition processes and their potential positive impacts on the 
warfighters.  In the case of MRAP, the use of proven technologies, minimized 
requirements, and multiple suppliers, have all contributed to the program’s success.  To 
 20
date, numerous American lives have been saved due to the speed at which the MRAP was 








The DoD’s government acquisition workforce is composed of three different groups.  
The first group includes senior political appointees, the second group includes military 
acquisition personnel (both officers and enlisted members), and the third group is 
composed of DoD’s civilian acquisition workforce.  Each of these groups serve a 
distinctive purpose, has different roles and responsibilities; and is often required to 
function in tandem with the others as part of achieving the required DoD acquisition 
missions.  Accounting for the precise numbers of these groups, however, can be 
somewhat difficult.  While political appointees are fairly easy to tabulate, military and 
civilian members become much more difficult, as definitions vary widely on exactly who 
is a member of the acquisition workforce. 
 
Within DoD, there are two methods used for counting DoD’s acquisition workforce.  The 
first, known as the “Acquisition Organization Counting Method” tabulates the acquisition 
workforce by adding up each of the 22 designated DoD acquisition organizations, 
irrespective of the particular occupation of the individual employee that is part of that 
organization (Department of Defense, 2006).  The second method is known as the 
“Refined Packard Method,” and combines both information related to the acquisition 
organizations as well as the job functions of employees within those organizations 
(Department of Defense, 2006).  In some cases, various refinements or alterations to 
these methods are also used to report acquisition workforce statistics.  For example, the 
Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act provided a very narrow counting 
method that was primarily used for supporting career development, but not necessarily 
ideal for overall workforce planning. 
 
Outside of DoD, the Federal Acquisition Institute (FAI) uses a much different 
methodology for tabulating acquisition workforce statistics, rooted in guidance from the 
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Office of Management and Budget (OMB).  This method only tabulates those employees 
who are members of a few specific GS occupational series; e.g. occupational series such 
as General Business and Industry (GS-1101), Contract Specialist (GS-1102), Purchasing 
(GS-1105), Procurement Cleric and Assistance (GS-1106) and key acquisition roles such 
as Program/Project Managers and Contracting Officer Technical Representatives 
(COTRs)7 (Federal Acquisition Institute, 2009).   
 
While, on the surface, such differences in definitions may not appear to be particularly 
problematic, in realty these varied counting methods produce widely different estimates 
of the acquisition workforce, that can make planning and efforts to modernize more 
difficult.  For example, using the data provided by FAI, DoD’s acquisition workforce in 
FY2008 consisted of just 43,063 personnel (Federal Acquisition Institute, 2009).  By 
comparison in FY2004 the “Acquisition Organization Counting Method” and the 
“Refined Packard Method” counted 206,653 and 134,602 respectively.  The impact of 
these differences can be significant, as varying definitions of the acquisition workforce 
can contribute to ineffective manpower planning and de-rail workforce modernization 
efforts.  To understand the acquisition workforce better we will now examine each 
member group in greater detail, beginning with senior political appointees.   
Senior Political Appointees. 
 
Presently, there are 54 civilian politically-appointed positions within DoD; with 32 in the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), 8 in the Office of the Secretary of the Army, 7 
in the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, and 7 in the Office of the Secretary of the Air 
Force.  In addition to the Secretary, particularly important senior members of the 
acquisition workforce within OSD include the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology & Logistics (USD AT&L); the Principal Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense for AT&L; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and 
Materiel Readiness; Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition; Director of Defense 
Research and Engineering; Director, Operational Energy Plans and Programs; and 
                                                 
7 Interestingly, however, only COTRs in civilian agencies are counted by the Federal Acquisition Institute 
(Federal Acquisition Institute 2009). 
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Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense 
Programs. Within each of the services the key acquisition positions include the Assistant 
Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology; within the Navy, the 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition; and within 
the Air Force, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, 2010). 
 
The roles filled by these senior political appointees is critical, not only for the functioning 
of all the acquisition organizations within the DoD, but also for the purposes of ensuring 
continuity of organizational missions and fulfillment of policy objectives.  In recent 
years, the confirmation process and qualifications necessary for political appointments, in 
addition to increasingly–restrictive post-service limitations have proven to be difficult 
impediments to recruiting and fulfilling staffing requirements for these highly important 
positions. 
 
Tenure and Confirmation Process.  
 
Government agencies are led by political appointees, and, there is often a high degree of 
leadership turnover.  As of 2009, the average tenure of Senate-confirmed appointees is 
only 3.3 years, and only 2.8 years for appointees that serve at executive departments 
(Breul 2009).  The average tenure of politically-appointed senior officials also tends to 
vary between government agencies.  For example, the turnover rate at DoD is much 
higher.  From 1949 through 1999, the average tenure of Secretary of Defense and Deputy 
Secretary of Defense were 30 months and 23 months respectively; and among other 
senior DoD officials, the most common tenure was between 11 and 20 months (Marcum, 
2001). 
An additional problem with political appointees is the significant lag time between a 
candidate’s nomination and Senate confirmation.  The Senate confirmation process of 
political appointees takes an average of 8.5 months—this is more than triple the time 
needed thirty years ago (Marcum, 2001).  This delay is caused, in some part, by the 
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increased scrutiny that Congress places on candidates, which has resulted in a more 
extensive vetting process by administrations.   
Due to the longer time required for Senate confirmations, and the higher turnover, the 
vacancy rates for political appointee positions have increased.  For example, at DoD, 
political appointee positions are vacant approximately 20 percent of the time (Marcum, 
2001).  This problem is highlighted by the current Administration’s difficulty in 
nominating qualified top-level political appointees that require Senate confirmation.  As 
of April 2010 (17 months after the election in Nov. 2008), 41 appointees (for DoD’s 
approximately 54 available positions) had been confirmed by the Senate.  Of the key 
acquisition positions within OSD, more than half were still awaiting confirmation one 
year after the President’s inauguration (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
2010).   
Finally, the use of Senate “holds” on political appointments serves as a major barrier to 
quickly navigating the confirmation process.  In many cases, “holds” are placed on 
political appointments by members of the Senate for political reasons, or to create a 
bargaining chip to leverage Federal funding for the member’s state—both factors that are 
independent of an appointee’s professional competencies or personal character.  
Qualifications.  
 
An additional factor directly related to the confirmation process, is the matter of 
appointee credentials.  In some cases, candidates are presented who may not necessarily 
meet the pre-requisites, as envisioned by Department leadership or Congress; but, due to 
extenuating circumstances (or perhaps political considerations), these individuals are 
submitted as suitable candidates for extremely-important acquisition positions.  For 
example, the recent nomination of Ashton Carter, as Under Secretary of Acquisition, 
Technology & Logistics, raised eyebrows among some because of a statutory 
requirement that the nominee for this position have experience as a senior executive 
within the defense industry—not an unrealistic expectation for a position that is the focus 
of DoD acquisition.  As a consequence, a waiver to this requirement would have to be 
granted unless it can be successfully argued that the candidate did fulfill the requirement 
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in his/her career (Bender, 2009).  The impact of permitting waivers to background or 
experience requirements is significant, as it undermines the value of establishing 
guidelines for high-level acquisition positions.  Critics of the industry acquisition 
experience requirement believe that such ties promote the potential for conflicts of 
interest and favoritism, in the event that high-level Department officials have previous 
relationships with the defense industry.  Proponents, alternatively, believe that because of 
the complex nature of defense acquisition, and the potential impact of monopsonist 
government actions on the industry, such experience is essential. 
 
As a result of these considerations, it is possible that the selection process is negatively 
impacting the quality of the workforce serving at the highest appointed levels within the 
Department.  Consequently, some of these senior positions may be held by those who:  
1. Could be confirmed (either for political reasons or otherwise, such as not 
having any existing conflict of interest issues);  
2. Were willing to adhere to the various restrictions required of senior level 
political appointees (such as restrictions on whom they may contact or work for 
after their appointments end);  
3. Could financially afford a significant pay cut from the prospect of a similar 
position in the private sector; and,  
4. Had a background that was minimally acceptable for the position or were able 
to secure a waiver to eliminate certain experience requirements. 
 
Impacts on the State of the Acquisition Workforce. 
 
The impact of short tenure, the confirmation process, and qualification requirements on 
the state of the acquisition workforce is considerable.  First, these factors contribute to a 
very high turnover rate, within DoD, for senior level acquisition positions.  High levels of 
turnover can be attributed to the general frustration some acquisition workforce members 
have with navigating DoD’s internal bureaucracy.  Furthermore, upon entrance into high 
level DoD acquisition positions, many higher-paying private sector employment 
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opportunities often emerge that draw these members out of the public sector.  Second, 
while the confirmation process is designed to allow Congress to provide its “advice and 
consent” of administration nominees, the prospect of going through the prolonged 
process can lead some nominees to resist accepting the potential nomination altogether.  
Third, the ethics restrictions that are required of nominees are more stringent now than 
ever before, which make many potential nominees hesitant to agree.  For example, 
President Obama’s first Executive Order issued upon entering office was the creation of a 
highly-controversial “ethics pledge”, which required all existing political appointees (and 
future nominees) to sign.  The most troubling condition of the “ethics pledge” is a series 
of revolving-door bans restricting an appointee’s employment activities for a period of 
two years after he/she leaves office.  Fourth, it is widely agreed upon that pay and 
benefits for senior political appointee positions within DoD are considerably less, when 
compared to positions with similar responsibilities in the private sector—in most cases 
these private sector positions pay several times what DoD can offer in salary.  This fact 
directly impacts a nominee’s decision to be considered, since they must be in a financial 
position to take a significant cut in pay and benefits.  Finally, because it is possible, in 
some cases, to secure waivers for minimum experience qualification standards, the 
original intent of statutory requirements demanding certain experience or education 
standards for appointees can be circumvented.   
 
The sum of all of these impacts is significant, as each directly influences decisions by 
those members of the potential appointee pool to be considered; and, consequently, 
degrades the overall quality of potential appointees, as individuals drop out of contention 
for various reasons.  Furthermore, such factors directly contribute to creating excessive 
delays in making appointments, in addition to high vacancy and turn-over rates.  In short, 
the factors noted above make it difficult to fill positions in a timely manner, and 
contribute to creating a smaller, and less qualified potential nominee pool, impacting the 
overall quality of those leaders at the highest levels of the acquisition workforce.  Finally, 
it must also be noted that the resultant shortened tenure, means that it is difficult if not 
impossible to make significant acquisition process changes that transcend an appointee’s 
term (since each new appointee has “their” initiatives that they want to push).  
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Military Acquisition Personnel. 
 
In addition to the role played by DoD’s appointed acquisition personnel, military officers 
and enlisted military acquisition professionals fulfill vital functions for the Department as 
well.  Currently, the number of military acquisition personnel has been significantly 
reduced (especially at the General Officer level), which we believe has directly 
contributed to problems with effective management of DoD acquisition programs.  
Further, within the military, there has been a long-time belief that acquisition and 
contracting work was a mere administrative function, which ultimately contributed to a 
general disinterest in these career paths across all services.  In some cases, individuals 
without proper training and/or experience are given acquisition positions (most notably 
those undertaking contingency contracting responsibilities; and, more recently, those 
assigned as Contracting Officer’s Representatives).  Thus we have identified two major 
factors influencing the state of the acquisition workforce as applied to military personnel 
as being: 1. the severe decrease in numbers; and, 2. the general lack of well trained or 




In 1958 during the Cold War, the three military services had more than 300,000 military 
officers on active duty.  Of this group, a mere 5,500 were assigned to research and 
development activities and roughly the same number were tasked with fulfilling 
acquisition and procurement related functions (Peck 1962).  By the mid 1980’s, military 
officers were tasked with managing over 90 percent of roughly 240 DoD program offices 
with ranks ranging from 0-5 (lieutenant colonel/commander) to 0-8 (major general/rear 
admiral) (President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, 1986).   
At the end of the Cold War, personnel reductions were expanded across all enlisted and 
officer members of the acquisition workforce.  As can be seen from Figure 2 below 
(among the smaller GAO definition of who is included), between FY1993 and FY1997, 
the military portion of the acquisition workforce decreased significantly, from roughly 




Figure 2. Military Members of the Acquisition Workforce (United States General Accounting Office, 
1998).8 
 
These reductions continued for an extended period, leaving just 15,820 military officers 
in acquisition positions by 2004, down from 17,703 in 1999 (United States Department of 
Defense, 2005).9 
 
Consistent with reductions across the enlisted and officer corps, senior officers in 
acquisition fields over time were also severely reduced from previous Cold War era 
levels.  For example, General Officers in an acquisition field have been reduced 
significantly in the Army, where, between 1990 and 2007, General Officers with a 
contracting background were reduced from 5 to 0.  Similarly, since 1995 the Air Force 
reduced its 40 General Officers in acquisition to just 24.  And, beginning in 1995, the 
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) reduced its staff of 4 General Officers 
in 1990 to none by 2007 (Gansler, 2009a).   
 
The value of having General Officers in these positions cannot be overstated. In a 
military environment, the number of General Officers associated with a particular field 
reflects its importance and provides high levels of accountability and professionalism.  
                                                 
8 This workforce count was compiled by GAO using data from the Defense Manpower Data Center and 
data from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) and (Acquisition 
Reform) and in the military services (United States General Accounting Office, 1998). 
9 This data was found using Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) and Defense 
Manpower Data Center (DMDC) data and verified via the “Refined Packard” counting method which only 
counts military officers in DAWIA as part of the workforce (United States Department of Defense, 2005). 
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Furthermore, General Officers in acquisition positions are also vital to ensuring that 
staffing assignment policies are adhered to, as these personnel will be responsible for 
populating the necessary military officers and enlisted personnel throughout the chain of 
command (in addition to the civilians who are also needed to fulfill acquisition functions 
of critical importance). 
 
Further complicating matters, associated with long-time reductions in military acquisition 
personnel, is clearly defining the number of military acquisition personnel required—
given the current state of the acquisition and operational environments.  As contracting 
actions and spending have increased significantly in recent years—primarily due to 
Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom—one would assume that the numbers 
of personnel should increase significantly as well. However, the services, have not 
necessarily agreed.  As noted by the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program 
Management in Expeditionary Operations (also known as the Gansler Commission), 
despite the Army having a 600 percent workload increase, only three percent of the 
Army’s contracting personnel are military personnel.  By comparison, the Air Force has 
approximately 37 percent of its contracting personnel as military personnel and the Air 
Force has not seen nearly the same increases in workload as the Army.   
 
The impact of such numerical deficiencies has become apparent in contingency 
contracting operations since, in many cases, it is incredibly difficult to find civilian 
employees willing to volunteer for these positions, due to the dangers of working in a 
war-zone.  Because recruiting civilian volunteers is difficult, much of the workload is 
handled by military personnel.  Consequently, because of Army shortages in numbers of 
contracting personnel, the Air Force has provided over 67 percent of the military 
contracting resources supporting the Army ground forces for operations in Iraq and is 
even overseeing most of the complex contract actions for reconstruction operations 
(Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary 
Operations, 2007).  While the Army has undertaken recent efforts to bolster the number 
of General Officers in key acquisition and contracting positions, evaluations must be on-
going to ensure the proper numbers of personnel are in place, at all times.  As 
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contingency contracting efforts are likely to be pervasive for years to come, effective 
oversight and management can only occur if the proper numbers of military personnel, 
and seniority, are assigned to perform vital acquisition functions.   
 
Finally, beyond contingency contracting, reductions in military personnel in other 
acquisition fields such as engineering can also be detrimental, since those military 
personnel can better understand and relate to the operational users.  Because the 
acquisition workforce has a mixed composition, with members from the military, civilian 
ranks, and private industry, it is important that the proper number of military personnel 
(especially at the highest levels) are present to effectively represent the warfighters 
through key phases of the acquisition cycle. 
 
Education and Training. 
 
As well as reductions in personnel, for some time a general disinterest has existed within 
the military for some acquisition positions, such as those in contracting.  This sentiment 
can be traced to the fact that, historically, contracting was considered an administrative 
position with less potential for promotion for those individuals seeking a military career.  
Consequently, acquisition functions have been seen as peripheral in importance to other 
functions to be completed by members of the military.  Only recently have serious efforts 
been undertaken to ensure that appropriate training, in various acquisition fields, was 
provided to military personnel.  For example, during the 1980’s the services only 
provided limited industrial management training for military officers that were to be 
assigned to key management positions within major acquisition programs (Snider, 1996).  
Because of this fact, a limited number of billets have been historically available for 
acquisition officers; creating a disincentive for younger officers to pursue this career path 
if they desired to remain in the military for an extended period of time.  Recent efforts, 
under the Defense Authorization Act of 2009 to increase billets for acquisition officers, 
are only a first step in attempting to resolve the issue and attract members of the military 
to become professionals in acquisition career fields.  
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One of the biggest examples of individuals who have lacked proper training and 
experience can be found in support for Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring 
Freedom.  Specifically, because of incredible differences between contracting in-theater 
and contracting at home, those military acquisition personnel who arrive for a 
contingency operation are often unprepared.  In particular, the focus of much training in 
acquisition fields, such as contracting, is on systems acquisition, which often overlooks 
the importance of skills needed for buying support services.  As a result, military 
personnel sometimes lack the knowledge of different processes that are typically needed 
for contingency contracting—work which focuses primarily on simplified, and rapid, 
acquisitions (Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in 
Expeditionary Operations, 2007). 
 
Additional concern has been raised over the role of Contracting Officer’s Representatives 
(CORs), and the potential that many serving in these roles have limited training to do so.  
A COR is an individual who is assigned by a contracting officer to assist in the 
monitoring, management or administration of a contract.  These individuals, typically, 
have other jobs and take on COR responsibilities as an ancillary duty.  In the contingency 
environment, COR responsibilities have traditionally been assigned to a junior individual 
who may have functional area expertise but little or no experience serving as a COR.  In 
this environment, CORs serve incredibly important roles assisting contracting officers, 
due to the high volume of support contracts; however, the use of individuals who are 
inadequately trained, simply to fill an urgent need, may (in fact) do more harm than good 
(Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary 
Operations, 2007). 
 
Further, despite DoD’s dependence on CORs, there is a general lack of information 
available about this group’s composition within DoD’s acquisition workforce.  For 
example, in 2009, it was noted in GAO’s testimony that there was no clear picture of how 
many CORs existed, or what their training and skills may be (Weigelt, 2009).  While 
there have recently been minor improvements regarding the training of CORs—including 
the use of a training class—this course may not be enough to ensure that these very 
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important members of the acquisition workforce are properly trained, given the 
importance of their position. 
 
Impacts on the State of the Acquisition Workforce. 
 
The severe reduction in numbers of military members of the acquisition workforce, along 
with a lack of requisite training and education for some of those in key acquisition 
positions, has significant impacts on the state of the overall acquisition workforce.  First, 
the reduction in numbers of personnel on the military side (despite an incredible increase 
in contracting dollars and actions) has placed a tremendous burden, and added pressure, 
on civilians and contractors to get the job done.  Furthermore, the severe reductions in 
personnel, and lack of appropriate training, have now also increased prospects for fraud, 
waste and abuse.  For example, in 2007, as noted by the Army Criminal Investigation 
Division (CID) Command, there were at least 78 open fraud cases involving a total of 
103 personnel in military operations taking place within Southwest Asia.  Of this group, 
83 individuals were Army enlisted and officer personnel—a truly disproportionate ratio 
(Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary 
Operations, 2007).  The inappropriate actions that were undertaken by this group were 
possible due to a lack of personnel performing oversight functions and poor training with 
respect to rules and regulations. 
 
Besides added prospects for fraud, waste, and abuse, the impact of using under-qualified 
members of the military to perform key acquisition functions can be significant.  For 
example, the hasty appointment of CORs directly contributes to the potential for poor 
acquisition outcomes.  While recent efforts have been undertaken to provide CORs with 
added training, this is only the beginning for getting this portion of the acquisition 
workforce properly qualified.  The COR position must be treated as a professional 
position within the acquisition workforce and not merely an added chore to be performed 
by whomever may be available.  Furthermore, DoD must do a better job of tracking who 
its CORs are, how much training they have, and how much time they are devoting to 
supporting contracting officers instead of performing their primary job duties. 
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Finally, across all services there is a long-standing tendency to simply view people who 
serve in the military as interchangeable parts, believing that they are capable of 
achievement simply because of their rank or specialty.  Such an approach fails to give full 
consideration to the individual talents held by each member of the military and who, in 
particular, may be well suited to fill a selected acquisition position (Wardynski, 2009). 
 
In sum, we believe that the combination of a reduction in the number of military 
acquisition personnel, in conjunction with some individuals filling acquisition positions 
without the appropriate training and education, directly contributes to producing negative 




Finally, the civilian component of the acquisition workforce provides the backbone of the 
day-to-day functions in support of DoD’s acquisition operations.  Over the past several 
years, the mission of this group has undergone radical changes (as discussed previously) 
as well as the emergence of two unique features: 1. major reductions in personnel; and, 2. 
the aging of the workforce.  Both of these features have substantial impacts on the current 
state of the acquisition workforce and its efforts to respond to the new dynamics of the 
acquisition environment. 
 
Reduction in Personnel. 
 
Following the end of the Cold War, a severe reduction in acquisition personnel took place 
as DoD had an infrastructure that far outweighed its anticipated demands for the future.  
As a consequence, without much strategic planning for the future (in terms of both 
recruitment and retention), DoD downsized its acquisition workforce significantly, a 
decision that ultimately influenced the later choice to supplement the acquisition 
workforce via “contractor augmentation.”   
 
“Contractor augmentation” was implemented as a means to provide short-term, on-
demand support, without the commitment and overhead required to sustain a larger, 
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federal workforce.  In some cases, this reliance has put DoD in a difficult management 
position, as the appropriate numbers of civilian personnel are no longer available to 
oversee and manage all of the contractors.  This has been noted in recent GAO reviews, 
where it has been highlighted that the Department does not even collect or track 
information on contractor personnel, including the precise number of contactor 
employees it has, or the functions which they are performing (GAO, 2009).  The lack of 
such vital information contributes directly to difficulties with long-term acquisition 
human capital planning, as estimating the appropriate number of government personnel 
needed to complete certain tasks becomes nearly impossible.  In addition, a lack of 
accurate information on contractors in the workforce adds to potential for personal and 
organizational conflicts of interest in the event that the proper numbers of government 
personnel are unavailable to oversee and monitor contractor activities.   
 
The reduction in numbers of DoD acquisition personnel occurred primarily between 1989 
and 1999, when DoD’s acquisition workforce decreased by roughly half, due to several 
acquisition reforms, base realignments, congressional legislation, and base closures.  As a 
result, there now exists a deficiency with respect to proper skills and experience of the 
workforce, and inadequate numbers to meet current contracting demands—not to 
mention the loss of institutional knowledge that will undoubtedly occur once additional 
members of the workforce retire in the near future (United States Government 
Accountability Office, 2002).  The reduction of the workforce was shown in Figure 1, 
where, despite recent steady increases in procurement spending, their numbers continued 




Aging of the Workforce. 
 
The second issue facing the state of the acquisition workforce is the age of its members.  
A significant proportion of the workforce is at or near retirement age.  Without careful 
planning, the potential exists for a major turnover of acquisition workforce personnel in 
the future, ultimately leading to a severe decrease in institutional knowledge as well as 
the short-term possibility of an increased workload for those employees who remain on 
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staff.  While about 31 percent of the private sector workforce is 50 or older, some 46 
percent of the federal workforce is 50 or older (Dinan, 2010).  Within DoD, an even 
higher percentage of its workforce is at or near retirement age.  For example, in 2005 the 
“Baby Boomers” and “Silent Generation” within DoD made up roughly 76 percent of the 
acquisition workforce; thus, a disproportionate number of employees are either ready to 
retire or approaching retirement age as can be illustrated by Figure 3 below (Anderson 


















Figure 3. Distribution of Workforce by Generation. (Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology & Logistics, 2007). 
 
Further, when looking at Figure 4, a clear distinction can be made in the distribution of 
the workforce by years of service at the 20-24 year mark, along with low separation rates 
for this group as well.  These separation rates are significantly lower than the separation 
rates for employees serving 19 years or less.  Such factors contribute directly to the 
current demographic make-up of the workforce, and open the door for problems 
including: 1) potential for large losses should employees decide to retire en masse; and, 
2) major increases in retirement spending in the future for both pay and benefits (not to 
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Figure 4. Distribution of Workforce by Years of Service. (Gates, 2008). 
 
In addition, when looking government-wide at data on occupational series, average ages 
within the 1101 (General Business and Industry) and 1102 (Contracting) series were 
47.11 years old and 46.26 years old respectively in FY2008.  For the 1105 (Purchasing) 
and 1106 (Procurement Clerical and Assistance) series occupations, the average ages 
were 49.25 and 49.92 years respectively.  Thus, the trend is clear the “age factor” within 
the acquisition workforce is not isolated to DoD alone but rather is a fact faced 
government-wide and has serious implications for contributing to significant turnover in 
the workforce due to increased retirements in the years to come (Federal Acquisition 
Institute, 2009).  
 
Further, when comparing new hires to retirements, it is evident that the replacement rates 
are not nearly great enough to stem the upcoming tide of older workers who will retire.  
For example, some 13 percent of those members of DoD’s civilian acquisition workforce 
who are in the contracting series were eligible to retire in 2008.  However, 30 percent of 
those in the contracting series will be eligible to retire in 2013, and about 50 percent will 
be eligible to retire in 2018.  Furthermore, when looking at new hires versus employee 
losses, for 2008, DoD hired only 2228 new employees in the contracting series, while 
they lost some 2291 employees to agency changes or occupation series changes.  The 
result is actually a net loss in contracting series personnel for the year, despite both 
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A final issue related to retirements within the DoD’s acquisition workforce is the 
variation in retirement decision-making trends between those employees who are subject 
to the Federal Employee Retirement System (FERS) and the Civil Service Retirement 
System (CSRS).  CSRS is a defined-pension-based system that provides employees 
generous, defined retirement benefits, paid in large part by the government.  
Alternatively, FERS, developed as a replacement to CSRS, has three components: a 
significantly smaller defined pension benefit plan, social security, and a thrift savings 
plan (an employee contribution plan with government matching funds).  The FERS 
employees are vested after 5 years, and, since the benefits have a degree of portability, 
these employees are more likely to be mobile.  On the other hand, CSRS has no benefits 
for individuals who leave or leave early.  Due to these conditions, the CSRS program 
provides an additional incentive for workforce members to remain Federal employees 
until they are eligible to retire with maximum benefits (Gates 2008).  The impact of this 
is an internal division within the civilian acquisition workforce: certain individuals are 
more likely to change jobs or retire earlier than others.  Depending on the distribution of 
this group within DoD, such a division has the potential to negatively impact the state of 
the workforce, thus accessibility to institutional knowledge and, ultimately, acquisition 
outcomes—for example, in instances where members of one retirement system make up a 
majority of a particular office or department. 
 
Impacts on the State of the Acquisition Workforce. 
 
The reduction in civilian acquisition personnel and the aging of the workforce has had a 
tremendous impact on the overall state of DoD’s acquisition workforce.  Impacts include: 
1. differences in workforce generations; 2. a lack of modern technical skills; and, 3. the 
establishment of large numbers of “career Federal employees” (i.e. those holding out 
until eligible for full retirement benefits). 
 
 
Differences in workforce generations. 
 
Because such a large number of acquisition workforce employees are older, on the whole, 
their familiarity with newly developed, rapidly changing information systems may be 
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limited.  Resistance to change has been endemic in this group, as their experience and 
training has been primarily rooted in the Cold War period.  Workforce generations can be 
characterized into several different classifications including the “Silent Generation,” 
“Baby Boomers,” and “Generation X’ers.”   
 
Besides age, numerous differences exist in each of these generations’ outlook on work 
and approach to completing their responsibilities while on the job.  For example, those 
more mature members of the workforce also tend to be relatively conservative (both 
financially and socially); highly value sacrifice, discipline, and teamwork; and likely lack 
skills and knowledge pertaining to modern information technology.  Comparatively, 
those workforce members that are part of the “Baby Boomer” generation are often said to 
be idealists, show individualism, and seek self-improvement.  This generation was 
responsible for building the first computers and wireless communications devices; as a 
result they are more attuned to technology than the previous generation.  Finally, the 
youngest members of the acquisition workforce likely fall into the “Generation X” 
category, which is also known as the “me” generation.  These individuals are said to be 
“the first to be shaped by the mass media,” and often find technology as a highly 
influential component of their lives.  Members of this generation often embrace diversity 
and focus on life/work balance, entrepreneurial spirit and pragmatism (Forman, 2005).   
 
The differences that exist in these workforce generations cannot be ignored, as these 
different generations are required to function as a part of the same workplace 
environment, and understanding of their differences and similarities is a key to 
effectively managing workplace performance and team relationships.  Finally, 
generational differences could be a specific factor influencing inefficiency within the 
workplace, as maintaining productive work relationships are ultimately hinged on the 






Lack of technical skills. 
 
Due to the downsizing of DoD’s acquisition workforce, which resulted in gutting many 
of DoD’s internal technical competencies (since the younger generation were the first to 
go) DoD was forced to increase its dependence on the private sector to provide 
specialized technical support.  In addition to this shortage of technical skills, a severe 
mismatch has also emerged between the career experiences of many current DoD 
acquisition employees and the requirements currently found within the twenty-first 
century acquisition environment.  Many employees began their service in an era where 
pen and paper, along with typewriters, dominated the world of DoD contracts.  For 
example, some 63 percent of government information technology workers are 45 years of 
age or older—a sure sign that younger IT professionals are currently not the backbone of 
the workforce (Otto 2010).  Consequently, as modern technology swept across the 
business world in recent years, the DoD has been slow to adopt information technology 
and implement existing commercial best-practices.  
 
Differences in workforce generations are directly tied to variations in technical skills 
among acquisition workforce employees in two categories: 1. technical skills required to 
use common, modern business technology; and 2. technical skills required to actively 
participate in highly technical acquisitions of systems.  The first category can be defined 
as those skills needed for day-to-day use of modern computer systems for organizational 
and project management tasks (such as general knowledge of word processing and 
spreadsheet software programs, etc.).  The second category can be defined as those highly 
technical skills needed to effectively participate in the acquisition of programs involving 
hardware and software, systems development and engineering, biotechnology, 
nanotechnology, etc.  The absence of these two types of technical skills can have two 
negative impacts: first, they can lead to resistance to the adoption and use of all available 
tools and systems for performing everyday functions; second, it can contribute to 
difficulty with managing the acquisition of highly-complex systems.  Both of these 
factors can ultimately contribute to poor acquisition outcomes. 
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Due to the limitations of DoD’s acquisition workforce, major programs have recognized 
that the organic workforce does not have the technical and managerial capability to 
oversee the integration of highly technical systems-of systems.  Thus, DoD has looked to 
the private sector for assistance.  The Army, for example, hired a contractor to act as the 
Lead System Integrator (LSI) for their Future Combat System (FCS).  It had been 
estimated that roughly 95 percent of the FCS performance would be controlled by 
software—a significant variation from the traditional hardware-based platforms acquired 
by the Army in the past.  The Army simply did not have personnel with the skills or 
experience required to manage a program with this size and scope, and had to seek 
outside contractor assistance.  The statistics given on precisely how much contractor 
support was required by the Army for this program highlights the potential extent of the 
technical deficiencies that may exist department-wide.  In the case of FCS, one estimate 
found 28 contractor representatives for every Army representative on the information 
network portion of the project.  When compared to a less IT based functional area such as 
the manned, ground vehicles team, the ratio decreased to 15 contractors for every Army 
representative.  Each of these numbers demonstrates the Army’s vulnerabilities with 
respect to technical skills available for system development in-house, and can be 
generalized to paint a larger picture of the absence of technical skills across DoD’s 
acquisition workforce (United States Government Accountability Office 2007).  The use 
of LSIs has been criticized for its apparent delegation of some inherently-governmental 
authority to the private sector, and the increased potential for conflicts-of-interest in 
“make or buy” decisions.  Consequently, in 2007, Congress included a provision in the 
National Defense Authorization Act of FY2008 that prohibited the use of LSIs starting in 
2010 (Gansler, 2009b) (Grasso, 2008). 
 
Career government employees.  
 
Because many members of DoD’s acquisition workforce have spent their entire 
professional careers serving the Federal government, some of these employees have little 
or no experience in the private sector.  According to the Acquisition Workforce 
Competencies Survey from 2008, the average Federal government acquisition workforce 
employee has 21 or more years of Federal acquisition service, and is aged between 51 
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and 55 years old (Federal Acquisition Institute, 2009).  Based on these statistics it is fair 
to assume that, despite perhaps a handful of short-term jobs at the beginning of one’s 
professional career, an overwhelming amount of the typical employee’s acquisition 
experience has been working for the government with little or no outside influences.  The 
absence of this outside experience limits the potential for these employees to develop 
new skills and knowledge—such as traditional commercial best-practices.  
 
Another consequence of having long-term career DoD employees is the internal re-
enforcement that occurs with respect to existing DoD-practices; ultimately leading to a 
resistance to change.  In this case, because an employee may have spent his or her entire 
career working for the DoD, they may become subject to a combination of internal 
repetitions and little outside influence.  For example, this is where many may become 
resistant to change because of a recurring belief that “this is how we’ve always done it.”  
Without seeing and experiencing any other way of doing things, internal reinforcement 
from working in the same professional environment for extended periods of time can be 
incredibly detrimental to reform efforts.  One example of this may be where DoD had 
previously experimented with instituting performance-based contracting in its 
acquisitions, in the 1970’s; however, these attempts were unsuccessful.  Because a 
significant proportion of DoD’s acquisition workforce was likely present for this, it may 
indeed have an impact on the resistance, internally, to implementing such performance-
based acquisition initiatives in the time since (Gansler, 2010). 
 
A final impact of this resistance-to-change mentality can be directly traced to how the 
acquisition workforce is responding to DoD’s shift away from primarily acquiring 
weapons and other goods to a new focus on purchasing services.  As a result, many in the 
acquisition environment have had their roles altered from being the “doers” to the 
“managers of the doers.”  This shift now requires the acquisition workforce members to 
cede performance of day-to-day tasks to support contractors, while fulfilling management 
and oversight functions.  This tremendous change has resulted in a new requirement for 
different types of skills for acquisition professionals than have been traditionally needed 
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for such positions—skills that could have been found by fulfilling management roles in 
private sector work environments.  
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IV. ’’Smart Buyers” for Twenty-First Century 
Requirements.  
 
The current state of the defense acquisition workforce is unable to meet the demands 
required in the twenty-first century acquisition environment.  Senior-level, politically-
appointed acquisition personnel, military personnel, and members of the civilian 
workforce have serious deficiencies in skills, experience, and numbers.  A balance must 
be struck between maintaining a workforce that has the proper numbers and is also 
competent, adaptable, and able to ramp up for additional workloads in times of high 
demand.  In short, workforce quantity is not a viable substitution for workforce quality.   
 
To achieve this level of quality, we believe the acquisition workforce must be 
transformed into “smart buyers” for the twenty-first century.  To accomplish this, we 
believe the acquisition workforce should: 1. have stable, experienced leadership; 2. be 
flexible; 3. be technologically savvy; 4. be focused on performance; and, 5. be ethical.   
Stable, experienced leadership. 
 
Stable, experienced leadership is of utmost importance for DoD’s acquisition workforce.  
All too often policies are not properly implemented and progress is lost due to rapid 
turnover of individuals at the senior levels of the Department and within the Services.  
Stability of experienced people, within the leadership ranks, in both civilian and military 
positions, can permit those functioning at the lower levels to be more successful and 
allow for more permanent changes in culture and attitude.  Because many of the 
following desired traits for the workforce will be new and different, implementation can 
only occur if a clear, consistent message is provided from the top.  Furthermore, stable 
leadership ensures that those individuals responsible for implementing change can be 
held accountable for any failures.  We believe stable, experienced leadership is the 






We believe the desired twenty-first century acquisition workforce must also be flexible 
and able to switch focus on short notice as unpredictability and variations in warfighting 
and operational requirements will dominate mission planning in the years ahead.  What 
this means for an individual member of the workforce is that they should possess a wide-
range of knowledge and skills (which should be constantly evolving) in order to 
effectively meet future acquisition needs.   
 
Skills of particular importance are in two distinctive areas.  First, acquisition personnel 
must have requisite business and economic skills to ensure they are capable of making 
best-value decisions.  These skills place added value on those personnel who have 
undergraduate or advanced degrees in business studies or other subject areas related to 
management, leadership, economics, finance, or accounting.  Second, the acquisition 
workforce will also require members with advanced technical skills.  Vital skills needed 
include knowledge of systems engineering, hardware and software development, 
biotechnology, nanotechnology, etc.  Those workforce members that contain multiple 
skill sets in these areas, or have cross training, are also highly desirable.  For example, a 
program manager with a bachelor’s degree in engineering as well as a master’s degree in 
business administration could provide essential expertise in two areas, and would likely 
contribute to positive acquisition outcomes.   
 
We also believe the acquisition workforce must be well educated in order to be flexible.  
In the modern context, well-educated members of the workforce are those with advanced 
training and education.  For most DAWIA certifications, an undergraduate or 
baccalaureate degree is already a pre-requisite; and, thus, such education is understood as 
a minimum standard.  We believe that an added emphasis needs to be placed on 
workforce members obtaining advanced graduate degrees in appropriate disciplines.  Of 
particular importance should be increasing the number of advanced degrees in science 




Finally, acquisition personnel must also become focused on the DoD acquiring 
warfighting capabilities; as opposed to using the threat-based approach to predicting 
warfighter needs.  To successfully meet requirements for the capabilities-based planning 
approach, workforce members must utilize technology, knowledge and experience to 
effectively anticipate what goods and services (and how much) may be required for a 
particular mission requirement, and then plan how best to acquire them.   
Technologically savvy. 
 
The defense acquisition workforce must also be responsive to changes in technology and 
advancements as they occur—this requires personnel to be able and willing to learn, 
throughout their careers.  In this respect, acquisition workforce members must be aware 
of technology that can potentially support military requirements, and, technology that 
supports acquisition processes and productivity in the workplace.  
 
First, personnel must be well versed in technologies that are rapidly changing, and which 
can impact the specific systems that they are acquiring for the DoD.  In this respect, 
DoD’s acquisition workforce must recognize and understand rapid technological 
advancements as they occur, such as major improvements in information technology, 
biotechnology, nanotechnology, etc., which can directly impact the state of a current 
acquisition program.  Those members of the acquisition workforce who work outside of 
direct research and development should maintain minimum levels of competency related 
to new technical capabilities that exist across the defense industry, and in the commercial 
world, as they occur. 
 
Further, acquisition workforce personnel should also be knowledgeable about the 
commercial market, so they may seek to maximize the use of commercial-off-the-shelf 
(COTS) solutions, in their DoD acquisitions.  As funding will likely be limited in the 
future, utilization of existing technology from the commercial marketplace can ultimately 
lead to improved performance, with significant cost savings as well as faster, more 
efficient acquisitions—especially in cases where the technology curve is accelerating 
faster than the development cycles within DoD’s acquisition environment.  In order to 
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make these acquisitions effectively, those personnel directly involved must be aware that 
such potential exists; and this requires a proactive, on-going assessment of the current 
commercial market. 
 
Secondly, the workforce must be aware of developments that will permit them to be more 
effective and efficient in the workplace.  Members of the acquisition workforce must be 
competent and comfortable with information technology solutions that can assist with, 
and automate, acquisition processes, as well as interface with other enterprise business 
systems.  
Focused on performance. 
 
The acquisition workforce must also be sensitive to the new performance-based business 
environment, which will put a premium on efficiency, effectiveness, and best-value 
decision-making.  For the acquisition of services, this requires an understanding of 
performance-based methods of acquisition, such as performance-based logistics (PBL) 
and performance-based services acquisition (PBSA).  For the acquisition of goods, this 
requires an understanding of how to make acceptable cost, performance, and schedule 
trade-offs during all phases of the acquisition cycle.  Members of the acquisition 
workforce must be performance-minded in the execution of their day-to-day duties and 
be invested in the process.  Personnel should be properly motivated and incentivized to 




Accountability for actions is highly important, both for the members of the acquisition 
workforce, and for the purpose of maintaining a legally compliant and ethical work 
environment that does not violate the public trust.  As such, it is vital that a culture of 
mutual legal and ethical behavior is cultivated, whereby the acquisition workforce is not 
only accountable for its own conduct, but also that of the contractors that they have hired 
to support them.   
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In DoD’s efforts to modernize its acquisition workforce, it must focus on ensuring its 
personnel are constantly trained in ethical and legal behavior.  Further, in an environment 
where conflicts-of-interest can occur, due to a large presence of contractors supporting 
DoD’s acquisition workforce, it is important that a culture of ethical behavior is fostered 







Several challenges exist that must be overcome in order to successfully transform the 
acquisition workforce, for the twenty-first century, to the desired state we have outlined.  
Of these challenges, retention and recruiting of new employees are perhaps the most 
important, in addition to overcoming experience gaps and addressing the emergence of 
organizational conflicts-of-interest.  The following section will briefly discuss each of 
these challenges, as faced by DoD in its efforts to reform the acquisition workforce. 
Retention.  
 
While retention rates government-wide are generally high, when compared to the private 
sector, as DoD’s acquisition workforce continues to age, retaining highly-skilled 
employees in certain positions will be increasingly difficult.  Aside from the 
aforementioned difficulties in retaining political appointees, additional issues have arisen 
with regard to retaining workforce members with in-demand skills and experience.  This 
group falls into two categories: 1. those newer employees who fall under FERS for their 
retirement benefits, and who are potentially mobile after five years of DoD service 
because the benefits are portable; and, 2. those members of the workforce who are part of 
CSRS and have become eligible for retirement making them mobile as well.  Because 
there are particularly high demands in the private sector for those workforce members 
with defense acquisition experience, particularly in certain career specialties such as 
contracting, program management or engineering, private sector employment becomes 
highly attractive to these individuals. 
 
To begin with, DoD may have difficulty, in the future, in retaining current employees 
with in-demand skills and experiences due to the low wages it offers its workforce.  
Typically, federal government jobs do not pay as much as their counter-parts in the 
private sector.  According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor statistics, federal pay is roughly 25 
percent lower than pay in the private sector for similar jobs.  Such a difference in salary 
incentivizes many current members of the workforce, who have the requisite expertise, to 
leave the DoD.   
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While, some recent research indicates that money matters less than non-pecuniary 
benefits for those who choose public sector employment—such as insurance, 
vacation/personal leave, job security, etc.—this may not necessarily apply to DoD 
(Lewis, and Frank, 2002).  For example, according to FAI’s 2008 Acquisition Workforce 
survey, those in the GS-1101 (General Business and Industry) and GS-1102 (Contract 
Specialist) job functions at DoD earn roughly 23 percent and 11 percent less, 
respectively, than the salary paid (on average) to their counterparts in civilian 
government agencies (Federal Acquisition Institute 2009).  This fact alone may impact 
employee decisions to remain employed within DoD, as opposed to transferring to other 
government agencies or leaving the public sector all together, for the private sector 
instead.   
 
An additional concern that has recently been raised by members of the acquisition 
workforce are the added rules and restrictions that make government employment 
undesirable compared to parallel opportunities in the private sector.  More specifically, 
current employees noted concerns over the complexity of DoD’s acquisition rules and 
performance accountability.  As noted by one scholar, retaining employees is becoming 
increasingly difficult because of the rising number of regulations in the work 
environment.  Consequently, additional oversight and lack of flexibility now makes many 
nervous that they could potentially be punished in the event that negative contracting 
outcomes occur, despite their adherence to all acquisition guidelines (Kauffman 2008).  
While added regulations and oversight may be well-intentioned, it may be contributing to 
a hostile or uncomfortable work environment.  Consequently, individuals who have 
alternative opportunities, allowing greater workplace flexibility, may be more likely to 
leave the DoD.  At a minimum, the regulations and oversight could foster a risk-adverse, 
inflexible culture.  
 
Finally, in the event retirees were willing to come back and work for DoD after they left, 
current rules exist which prohibit their re-hiring without a cut in pay equivalent to their 
existing pension benefits.  Such restrictions make return to government employment after 
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retirement incredibly unattractive when compared with the potential flexibility and salary 
available for similar positions in the private sector (Davidson, 2009).   
 
In short, those members of the acquisition workforce with in-demand skills, and mobility 
in retirement benefits, may find more lucrative opportunities in the private sector.  DoD 
will be challenged with finding ways to retain these employees, in order to ensure their 




Beyond retention of current employees is the additional problem of recruiting new 
acquisition workforce personnel.  Problems with recruitment occur as a result of several 
factors.  First, a shrinking talent pool—particularly in highly-technical areas—will lead to 
increased recruitment problems in the future.  Given retirements and loss of current 
employees for other reasons, it is estimated that job growth in the science and 
engineering fields will occur at roughly three times the pace of other positions in the 
workforce.  Despite this massive increase in demand however, the number of U.S. 
science and engineering graduates remains flat, which will directly contribute to DoD’s 
difficulties in recruiting acquisition professionals (Anderson Jr., 2008).  These levels of 
science and engineering graduates can also be tied to a larger problem in the U.S. 
educational system where incredibly low numbers of highly-qualified teachers and 
professors in science and engineering make it incredibly difficult to properly educate 
students (National Academy of Sciences, 2006).  Without a basic educational system that 
is structured to train students in high-demand areas, such as the hard sciences and 
engineering, DoD will continue to face severe difficulties in recruiting hirable employees 
with technical expertise. 
 
Second, in some cases, where highly-talented individuals with in-demand technical 
backgrounds do exist, DoD is unable to hire them because they do not meet requirements 
to obtain a security clearance, or are unable to work for the government because they are 
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non-citizens.10  For example, National Science Foundation data shows that in the United 
States, for 2005, foreign students earned 34.7% of the doctorate degrees in the sciences 
and approximately 63.1% of the doctorate degrees in engineering.  Furthermore, those 
foreign students on temporary resident visas earned 30.8% of the doctorates in the 
sciences, and some 58.6% of the doctorates in engineering (Matthews, 2008). 
 
The impacts these statistics have on DoD’s ability to recruit are significant.  First, U.S. 
citizenship is an essential component for the granting of a security clearance, and federal 
employment in general—without citizenship, these foreign scientists and engineers are 
unable to work for DoD.  As foreigners compose a significant portion of the talent pool 
available to DoD for recruitment, their inability to obtain security clearances and 
citizenship needed for employment shrinks the available pool of qualified personnel 
available to DoD acquisition workforce modernization.   
 
Second, as noted by multiple sources, DoD’s recruitment process takes too long and 
creates severe delays for potential employees.  In many cases, such delays result in many 
applicants simply giving up, due to the volumes of paperwork required and the slow 
responses, which can typically take several months.  In July of 2002, for example, the 
National Academy of Public Administration reported that Federal “hiring remains a slow 
and tedious process,” and that “current hiring methods [did] not keep pace with the 
private sector” (National Academy of Public Administration, 2002).  This sentiment was 
further articulated by the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) who noted that “one 
of the most common complaints about the Federal hiring process is that it takes too long” 
(United States Merit Systems Protection Board, 2006). 
 
Furthermore, according to the MSPB, a “large majority believe it should take no longer 
than 8 weeks to fill merit promotion jobs with internal or external candidates,” however 
                                                 
10 Executive Order 11935 permits the hiring of non-citizens with Office of Personnel Management 
approval only when there are no qualified citizens available.  A non-citizen hired in the absence of a 
qualified citizen may only be given an excepted appointment, and does not acquire competitive civil 
service status.  He or she may not be promoted or reassigned to another position in the competitive service, 
except in situations where a qualified citizen is not available.  The non-citizen may be hired only if 
permitted by the appropriations act and the immigration law (President of the United States, 1976). 
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this desired timeline is almost never met.  Evidence to support such a claim can be found 
by examining the number of days required to hire employees into the Federal system.  In 
1999, a Merit Systems Protection Board survey found that supervisors estimated it took 
some 204 calendar days from the time the approval process began to fill a vacancy 
through when the selectee was notified and actually hired.  Later, in 2003, the GAO 
reported it took an average of 102 business days (from the time the request was initiated 
through when the applicant finally received an offer) to complete all of the steps required 
to fill a government position via the competitive hiring process (United States Merit 
Systems Protection Board, 2006).   
 
As a result of extended timelines, GAO found that significant delays in hiring had a direct 
influence on candidate interest in the positions—as application decisions are delayed, 
candidates become less interested (and in some cases unavailable) to fill the position once 
an offer is made.  For one agency which GAO examined, it was found that only 1 in 20 
applicants (or 5 percent) who were offered a job, were still interested in the position, due 
to the severe delays in hiring (United States Government Accountability Office, 2003).  
This is further supported by a MSPB survey respondent who stated that the time between 
applying and the time the applicant was called for an interview was unacceptable.  The 
applicant had ultimately given up because he/she believed they were not getting a job 
offer (United States Merit Systems Protection Board, 2006). 
 
One direct cause of hiring delays can be traced to the fact that DoD does not offer a 
single, streamlined, online process for submitting applications to jobs.  Application 
procedures vary widely by agency or office, with some accepting online applications and 
others requesting submission of applications in hard copy or fax; as can be seen from an 
examination of current job postings on www.USAJOBS.gov (the federal government job 
posting website).  While some applications can be processed using the website, many job 
postings simply provide instructions on how to apply and re-direct an applicant to a 
different website where applicants are tasked with creating an additional user profile and 
resume for the purposes of submitting an application.  These variances in application 
procedures contribute to a cumbersome application process, and ultimately deter potential 
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applicants from applying because of the additional work that is required to be considered 
for multiple positions.   
 
In addition, wide variances in application processes within the government make it 
difficult for applicants to understand what needs to be done to apply.  According to a 
2001 survey of college students from the National Association of Colleges and 
Employers, it was found that 37 percent of respondents did not understand the application 
process for Federal employment (United States Merit Systems Protection Board 2006).  
Comparatively, in the private sector, many large firms have created a single, integrated 
system for vetting and processing applicant information and providing real-time status 
updates, making application submission relatively easy and substantially faster.  
Furthermore, many private sector firms also utilize existing online hiring solutions, such 
as HotJobs.com or Monster.com to receive, process, and manage applications.  DoD’s 
inability to streamline its hiring process to mirror those of successful private-sector firms 
is a significant barrier to acquisition workforce modernization. 
Experience Gaps.  
 
An additional challenge that exists for effectively modernizing the acquisition workforce 
for the twenty-first century are the gaps between the life and work experiences of current 
employees and the skills needed to support new DoD mission requirements.  While 
measures such as the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) have 
been implemented for the purposes of enhancing the training and skills of employees 
serving across all facets of DoD acquisition, they have not necessarily been effective to 
ensure that the proper mix of skills and experience are achieved by acquisition personnel.  
For example, the DAWIA requirement for specific qualifying experience within a given 
functional area can be limiting to career development for civilian employees.  These 
DAWIA standards make it difficult for an employee to gain parallel experience in related 
fields for the purposes of diversifying their backgrounds.  Thus, in many cases civilians 
become limited to a single functional career path—many times, in a single location—a 
factor that limits flexibility and ability to contribute to a wide range of acquisition needs 
(Garcia, 1997).  
 56
 
Furthermore, the workforce currently lacks technical skills and experiences as a result of 
both the reduced numbers of acquisition personnel and the aging of the workforce itself.  
As a result, in-house capabilities at DoD have been severely limited in terms of both 
volume of capable personnel and the breadth of their experiences.  One example (as 
noted above) is the roughly 28 to 1 contractor/DoD employee ratio on the Army’s FCS 
for highly technical areas, such as information network portion of the project.  Such an 
imbalance highlights DoD’s dependence on outside support for highly technical 
development projects, due to its own depleted internal technical capacities. 
 
In addition to a lack of technical skills and experience, other areas such as contracting 
and project management have experience gaps as well.  As can be summarized from the 
2008 Federal Acquisition Institute survey, Federal employees themselves indicated where 
severe skills gaps exist.  For example, when Federal program managers were surveyed 
they indicated that competency gaps existed in areas such as contracting, business, cost 
estimating, and financial management.  Further, Federal contracting employees who were 
surveyed indicated a need for additional training in performance-based acquisition, 
financial management, dispute resolution, defining requirements, and negotiation 
(Federal Acquisition Institute, 2009).  When such skills are explicitly required for these 
positions, and the employees themselves (in their own self-assessment) acknowledge 
experience shortfalls, it highlights where the workforce’s vulnerabilities exist.    
 
Finally, DoD must take steps to understand the competences of its workforce and assess 
their skills and experiences on a regular basis.  As of April 2009, only 21,000 members of 
the 126,000 member defense acquisition workforce completed competency assessments 
(Assad, 2009).  The failure to accomplish these assessments, in a fast and efficient 
manner, degrades the ability of DoD to properly evaluate the state of its workforce, and 




Management of Blended Workforce. 
 
DoD’s current acquisition workforce model is based upon leveraging a blend of civilian, 
military, and contractor personnel to perform key acquisition functions.  This blended 
workforce requires a unique approach to management and presents a host of additional 
challenges.  Of particular concern are issues with: 1. understanding the definition of 
“inherently governmental” work that must be performed by DoD personnel; 2. avoiding 
conflicts-of-interest; and, 3. having a complete view of workforce composition and 
functions. 
 
The first difficulty to overcome within the blended workforce model is properly 
identifying what functions are considered “inherently governmental.”  A widely accepted 
definition of “inherently governmental” functions is those functions which must be 
performed by the Federal government because they are “intimately related to the public 
interest” and cannot be contracted out.  An example of an “inherently governmental” 
function that is performed routinely by acquisition personnel is the evaluation of 
proposals and awarding of contracts.  With the volume and complexity of DoD’s 
acquisitions, this definition has been subject to many interpretations, which are not 
always consistently applied.  Clarity on this subject is critical, both to maintain the 
integrity of the acquisition process, as well as for future human capital planning.   
 
In late March 2010, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Office of Federal 
Procurement Policy, released a draft memo in which it clarified the definition of 
“inherently governmental” work.  While this memo is not finalized, it does offer a sample 
of definitions which could go into effect.  The memo makes three proposed changes to 
current DoD policy regarding the subject.  First, the memo proposes the adoption of the 
FAIR Act definition of ``inherently governmental function'' as the single government-
wide definition of this term, i.e. “an activity” is inherently governmental when it is so 
intimately related to the public interest as to mandate performance by Federal employees.  
 
Second, the memo proposes providing guidance for determining the criticality of 
functions by identifying criteria for determining when positions dedicated to performing 
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critical functions must (or should) be reserved for Federal employee performance.  
However, most federal workers feel their work is “critical”—therefore all work is 
“critical.”  Finally, the memo proposes that agencies should be required to develop 
agency-level procedures, conduct training, periodically review internal controls, and 
designate one or more senior officials to be responsible for implementation and 
maintenance of the policy (Office of Management and Budget, 2010).  The major impact 
of this memo is the new set of ambiguities it creates, inside the Department, as specific 
interpretation and implementation policies and procedures must be created, DoD-wide, to 
ensure compliance with the memo’s guidance. 
 
The second difficulty that must be overcome is the issue regarding personal and 
organizational conflicts-of-interest.11  Recently, both of these issues have become major 
causes of concern, given questions over some political appointees as well as the increased 
use of contractors to provide support to DoD acquisition personnel.  
 
With respect to political appointees, personal conflicts-of-interest have been raised as 
issues of concern when a former high-ranking industry employee is presented as a 
potential political nominee.  While, on one hand, several high-level acquisition positions 
require industry experience; on the other hand, questions have been raised over the 
prospect of such industry experience contributing to favoritism or bias toward particular 
firms, once a nominee is appointed.  This situation makes it challenging for any nominee 
with the requisite industry experience, as required by law, to be confirmed without 
raising questions over the potential for personal conflicts-of-interest.  
 
                                                 
11 Personal conflicts-of-interest (PCI) occur when actions are influenced by a desire for personal gain.  
Conflicts-of-interest among government employees have always been a concern.  Contractor employees 
often work inside DoD facilities, when supporting the DoD acquisition workforce, creating a blended, 
multi-sector workforce. 
Organizational conflicts-of-interest (OCI) occur when a contractor has an interest that might bias the 
firm’s judgment, or create an unfair competitive advantage because of impaired objectivity (which can arise 
when the work involves evaluation), unequal access to information, or biased ground rules.  Even when 
firms have established “firewalls,” there can still be the appearance of organizational conflict-of-interest.   
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On a broader scale, organizational conflict-of-interest problems arise when DoD 
personnel or contractor employees are performing functions that may come in conflict 
with the interests of their firm, drawing into question whether the contractor is able to 
successfully complete their job without biasing the outcome toward their own company’s 
advantage.  Accordingly, some government officials believe that not enough is being 
done to prevent organizational conflicts-of-interest, given the acquisition workforce’s 
dependency on contractor support.  For example, a firm may have a consulting contract 
with a program office, while another division from the same firm may be competing to do 
development work for the very same program.  Further, there is some concern of the 
impact of adding additional controls, including questions regarding increased costs and 
decreased efficiency, which have been raised regarding negative impacts of conflict-of-
interest reform.  
 
Currently, there are significant numbers of contractor employees that work directly with 
DoD acquisition personnel and support them in their daily functions.  In some cases, this 
is because the government may not have the required number of people with the required 
technical skills.  In other cases, these contractors were brought on board because 
programs have struggled to hire personnel for authorized in-house positions.  The 
inability to fill these positions can be directly tied to DoD’s difficulties in recruiting 
qualified candidates for available jobs.  Of some 50 major weapon systems programs 
recently reviewed by GAO, it was found that only 19 (or 38 percent) were able to fill all 
authorized in-house staffing positions.  In many of these cases, contractors have been 
brought in to maintain program continuity (Government Accountability Office 2010).  Of 
course, in all of these cases, the critical issues are whether the contractors are performing 
inherently-governmental functions (or simply supporting the government workers who 
are) and, secondly, whether these contractors have any conflicts-of-interest. 
 
As of April 2009, DoD estimated some 52,000 contractor personnel were performing 
acquisition support functions.  Based on these numbers, contractor personnel represent 
some 29 percent of DoD’s total acquisition workforce.  Still, the presence of contractors 
within various acquisition offices varies significantly, and can greatly exceed the 29 
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percent estimate.  For example, based on one GAO review of 21 DoD program offices, 
15 (or roughly 71 percent) of the offices had more contractor personnel than government 
employees.  Within these 15 offices, contractor personnel comprised some 88 percent of 
the workforce (United States Government Accountability Office, 2009).  Such statistics 
demonstrate the general level of dependence DoD has on contractors supporting its 
acquisition workforce (again, whether this causes problems depends upon the two, above-
noted issues i.e. inherently-governmental and conflict-of-interest).  Ironically, in this 
blended workforce environment, the personal conflict-of-interest regulations that apply to 
the government workforce (as can be seen from Figure 5) do not apply to contractor 
employees (United States Government Accountability Office, 2009).   
Prohibition, restriction, or requirement 
Applicable to federal 
employees?  
Applicable to DOD contractor 
employees?  
Bribery, kickback, other graft  Yes  Yes  
Participating in matter affecting personal 
financial interest  Yes  No12 
Avoiding appearance of partiality when 
performing duties  Yes  No13 
Disclosing financial interests  Yes  No13 
Accepting travel and gifts  Yes  No13 
Using nonpublic information for personal gain  Yes  No13 
Future employment contact  Yes  No13 
Misusing position to provide preferential 
treatment to a private interest  Yes  No13 
Figure 5. Government vs. Contractor Conflict of Interest Prohibitions. (United States Government 
Accountability Office, 2009). 
 
Moreover, in April of 2010, DoD released information on proposed rules it wishes to 
establish for the purposes of minimizing OCI.  The memo proposed an organization of 
rules concerning OCIs, the introduction of standard provisions and clauses (provided 
contracting officers retain the ability to modify these as needed), and expansion of 
coverage for OCI rules to address unique situations (such as task and delivery orders) 
(United States Department of Defense, 2010). 
A third major challenge with the blended workforce environment, beyond OCI and PCI, 
is DoD’s difficulty in tracking the number of contractors supporting its workforce, as 
                                                 
12 There may be other laws and regulations that may apply to DoD contractor employees depending on the 
facts and circumstances of a particular case.  
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well as the functions contractors are performing.  In short, DoD’s knowledge is 
particularly limited with respect to how contractor personnel are being used, and what 
skills they are providing to supplement deficiencies in DoD’s acquisition workforce—
making effective strategic planning virtually impossible.   
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VI. Recommendations.  
 
To successfully overcome the previously mentioned barriers, and to achieve the desired 
state of the acquisition workforce, we recommend the following actions be taken: 
Increase Stability for Senior Acquisition Leadership. 
 
Frequent changes in senior leadership often lead to significant changes in an 
organization’s priorities, goals, and strategy.  These changes can also significantly impact 
relationships with partnering organizations.  Frequent leadership turnover can also 
insulate and strengthen the existing organizational culture. Long-term, or permanent, 
employees may be reluctant to participate in organizational change initiatives that 
significantly change their day-to-day responsibilities when the leaders who initiated these 
changes are not present to see them through; this makes improving processes more 
difficult.   
At the program level, the lack of sustained leadership often contributes to program delays 
and setbacks, which can create tension among stakeholders.  To the degree possible, 
senior government leaders must ensure that there is program continuity, especially with 
key program leaders.  All possible actions should be taken to ensure consistent program 
leadership by maintaining stability of key personnel (allowing for promotions in place is 
one way to encourage this). 
Develop the Required Human Capital. 
 
In order to effectively develop the required human capital for the modern acquisition 
environment, we believe that DoD must enhance its recruitment processes; improve the 
hiring process; strive for quality not quantity; provide competitive wages; incentivize 








Improving the acquisition workforce will require a greater focus on recruitment of entry-
level/mid-level acquisition personnel.  Recruiting Generation Xers and Millennials, 
however, presents several challenges.  First, is finding them.  This will require 
understanding where these individuals look for jobs; this often includes specialty 
websites and social networking sites.  Second, is to make the organizations appealing to 
these job-seekers.  The younger generations are often not motivated in the same way as 
their older predecessors, and in many ways are looking for different work experiences.   
 
We believe one approach worth developing and expanding are intern programs.  These 
cooperative programs could include scholarships, coupled with an internship, and finally 
employment, following successful completion of the program.  Such an effort would aid 
in shoring up the composition of the workforce and assist in maintaining stability as a 
significant number of older workforce members are nearing retirement.  Furthermore, 
additional recruitment incentives and specialized internship programs could be created 
for those students who excel in high demand functional areas such as information 
technology and the hard sciences.   
 
Some agencies already have operating programs.  The Defense Logistics Agency hires 
more than 200 interns each year and The Defense Contract Management Agency 
(DCMA) hires approximately 100 interns per year (Anderson Jr. 2008).  Additionally, the 
Navy Acquisition Internship Program (NAIP), another example, has recently been 
expanded to permit 500 new interns per year (Thomsen 2009).  Further expansion of 
these and similar programs is highly desirable, given the demographics of the acquisition 
workforce, and shortages of personnel in key fields.   
 
Additionally, DoD must ensure it is placing emphasis on creating internship programs 
that are specifically designed for recruitment of career employees.  In short, DoD must 
target interns who are well suited for direct employment following the completion of the 
internship.  For those internship programs which seek to simply hire interns for 
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temporary periods—such as those designed for students over the summer—DoD must 
actively track how such programs impact DoD recruitment in the long-run. 
 
It must also be noted that the simple expansion of an intern program, does not address the 
entire recruitment issue.  According to a recent RAND analysis, while it was true that 
NAIP participants were promoted quickly once brought aboard in a full-time capacity, 
after just five years of employment participants in the NAIP were neither more or less 
likely to remain working for the Navy, or even the Defense Department than others who 
did not participate in the program (Gates 2009).  DoD must capitalize on the inherent 
value provided by intern programs to attract highly capable talent, successfully train 
them, and potentially match intern skills and experiences with a suitable career 
opportunity. 
 
In addition to internships, another effective recruitment tool could be the expansion of 
collaborative educational programs between the DoD and universities.  One example of a 
successful program that currently exists is between Warner-Robins Air Logistics Center 
and Macon State University.  The arrangement permits Warner-Robins employees and 
university students to take classes specifically designed jointly by the Air Force and the 
university to focus on contracting studies.  In the program, Macon State University has 
been able to condense ten Defense Acquisition University contracting courses into three 
college level courses which can be taken for credit (Defense Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics, 2008). 
 
Further, students who take part in the program are then offered opportunities to gain 
hands-on experience by working at the logistics center (Federal Acquisition Institute, 
2009).  The partnership has been highlighted as being successful on multiple fronts.  Not 
only does the program create a potential recruiting pipeline by providing ready-to-work 
employees; it also permits other individuals who may be working in the private sector an 
opportunity to learn about DoD contracting as well.  Programs like this should be 
expanded to aid in generating ready-to-work personnel in the talent pool (Defense 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 2008). 
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Improve the hiring process. 
Although there are some exceptions, DoD’s current hiring processes take too long, are 
too complex, discourages new and mid-level entries, and frequently do not maintain a 
consistent mechanism for “process” compliance.  This is often exacerbated by the time 
required to obtain a security clearance once an employee is hired.  As a result, many 
applicants get frustrated, give up, and seek employment elsewhere.  Efforts to improve 
DoD’s hiring process must be accelerated.   
Recently the OMB issued important policy requiring Federal Agencies to improve hiring 
practices.  First, they must map the agency’s hiring process from start to finish; second, 
they must ensure job announcements are clearly produced; third, they must communicate 
with applicants during the application process to advise them of their applications status.  
And, finally, hiring managers must be actively engaged at all phases of the hiring process 
(Davidson, 2009).  These reforms must be implemented immediately and their impact 
must be periodically evaluated to perpetuate continuous improvement. 
Strive for quality not quantity. 
As DoD downsized its workforce, it lost much of its in-house capability and diminished 
the overall quality of its internal talent pool.  In DoD’s effort to modernize the workforce, 
it must also seek to ensure it is creating a quality workforce, instead of merely seeking to 
meet quantity goals.  Quality can be defined as recruiting those individuals with in-
demand skills, unique experiences and interdisciplinary expertise.  Key fields requiring 
high quality personnel include the sciences, engineering, information technology and 
business.   
Provide competitive wages. 
Additionally, DoD must provide competitive wages to recruit and retain members of its 
acquisition workforce.  While government employment does offer the prospect of 
substantial benefits and relative job security, it does not compete well with the private 
sector in terms of wages, especially within the acquisition workforce.  Compensation 
packages must be revised as necessary to ensure current employees and potential new 
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hires are well paid with salaries comparable to the private sector.  While it is likely that it 
will be difficult to meet the standard of private-sector salaries, dollar-for-dollar, we 
believe an incentive-type pay structure will be key to ensuring that employees are 
properly compensated.   
 
Incentivize employees for improved performance. 
 
Another desirable quality for the acquisition workforce is that they are properly 
incentivized for improving performance outcomes.  Reform must begin with workforce 
performance accountability.  The current system within DoD has created an environment 
that is highly removed from the conditions of the traditional labor market, whereby lower 
and mid-level government employees remain for extended periods of time, performing 
the same functions, (potentially at low levels of performance) with the prospect for little 
or no performance accountability.   
 
Like the private sector, DoD acquisition personnel should be incentivized for 
performance.  In the private sector, there is widespread agreement that pay-for-
performance systems are successful within organizations that have strategic policies 
providing top-down guidance and direction for their implementation.  Furthermore, such 
success is also highly dependent upon employees’ perceptions of performance within the 
organization itself (Murray, 2009).  In other words, for these programs to work, they must 
be properly communicated from the top of the organization, and performance 
expectations and standards must be widely accepted and understood among employees. 
 
Within the context of DoD acquisition, performance can refer to the efficiency and 
performance of employee actions, the amount of money a program has saved, the 
timeliness of employee activities—even, perhaps, for contracting personnel—the rates 
that contracts are protested and sustained.  In all of these cases, some type of 
compensation (either in terms of promotion or pay) could be applied to those DoD 
employees that meet high performance standards for some or all of the metrics noted 
above.   
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A recent effort to include performance incentives for members of DoD’s workforce via 
the National Security Personnel System (NSPS)13 faced significant resistance from 
multiple sources (including the employee union, the American Federation of Government 
Employees) and was ultimately repealed in the FY2010 Defense Authorization Act 
(Corrin, 2010).  Because NSPS had only been operational for a short period, the 
opportunity for program reform and long-term evaluation was lost.  This concern was 
highlighted by Dr. John Crum of the United States Merit Systems Protection Board who 
noted that: “pay-for-performance systems may need to evolve over time, as part of a 
regular evaluation and modification process to ensure that they are fostering the 
achievement of organizational goals” (Defense Business Board, 2009).   
 
Although the NSPS initiative has been repealed, DoD should continue to evaluate the use 
of pay-for-performance systems through the implementation of pilot programs.  
Historically, DoD has undertaken numerous demonstration projects which have used 
alternative pay systems.  Examples include the Navy’s “China Lake” project, DoD’s 
AcqDemo project, and DoD’s Laboratory Demonstration Program.  In addition, members 
of the Senior Executive Service (SES) are currently under a performance-based pay 
system that exists government-wide.  These programs have consistently demonstrated 
that performance-based pay systems can work in the DoD with proper attention given to 
both change management and leadership.  These programs have further shown that the 
highest performing employees can be paid the most; that performance – not time – can be 
an effective driver of pay; that costs in these programs are controllable; that work levels 
can be broadly defined; and, that sensitivity to specific locations and occupations can be 
achieved (United States Office of Personnel Management, 2005).  Recent efforts in 
Congress, undertaken to implement performance incentives and included in the 
IMPROVE Acquisition Act,14 should be examined for implementation by DoD as well.  
                                                 
13 NSPS was a pay-for-performance pay system that sought to replace the traditional General Schedule 
(GS) grade pay system, for federal employees within DoD, with a pay band system that would permit 
flexibility in setting pay rates, hiring, firing, reassignment, and performance measurement. 
14  Provisions within the IMPROVE Act demand greater accountability from the acquisition workforce, 
improve financial management, expand the industrial base to increase competition, and reward members of 
the acquisition workforce who save DoD money (Matthews, 2010). 
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This Act includes provisions to reward employees for cost savings within the DoD 
acquisition community through increased rates of pay or promotion (Matthews, 2010). 
 
We believe DoD should comprehensively examine these pilot programs (both past and 
present) to evaluate which features could be further implemented in other programs, 
across DoD, to provide performance incentives to members of its acquisition workforce. 
 
Provide incentives for additional training and education. 
We also believe that major incentives must be created for employee training and 
educational advancements, to ensure the workforce continues to expand its capabilities 
and is properly motivated to do so.  Without such motivation, members of the workforce 
have little incentive to seek additional training or education.  By encouraging training and 
education, employees will gain additional knowledge and bring that knowledge into the 
workplace, allowing for process improvements, along with increased efficiency and 
performance.   
 
We believe it is not enough to merely pay for training, as many programs within the 
government currently permit, but rather employees must also be properly compensated 
either through direct reimbursements or faster advancements.  Additional training in key 
areas that are vital to job functions (such as law, contracts, accounting, etc. for 
contracting personnel, or systems engineering, software, hardware, etc. for engineering 
personnel) can have an immediate impact on productivity and ensure that employees are 
aware of recent changes within the industry and current best practices.  
 
Further, employees should be rewarded even more for seeking additional education (such 
as advanced degrees or professional certifications) in high-demand fields, such as 
information systems, networking, systems engineering etc.  Potential rewards could 
include not only pay increases or bonuses but also opportunities for rapid promotion.  
Such an effort not only helps close the current technical knowledge gap, but also 
enhances the capabilities of the workforce.  Ultimately, this effort could reduce the need 
for contractor personnel to be involved in those highly technical functions that may also 
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be considered critical, or bordering on “inherently governmental,” or raise prospects for 
conflicts of interest, purely because DoD is unable to supply properly-qualified 
personnel.   
 
Finally, it must be recognized that often the managers of acquisition workers (due to the 
shortage of skilled workers and the heavy workloads) are reluctant to allow their people 
to take the time off for the desired education.  Thus, staffing plans (especially for the 
civilian workforce) must be based on the assumption (as the military plans do) that some 
percent of the people will be in training at any given time, thus removing the current 
disincentive to such training. 
Improve Workforce Agility. 
 
Another key to modernizing the acquisition workforce, for the twenty-first century 
environment, is to ensure that its members are agile enough to appropriately respond to 
rapidly-changing requirements.  To foster this agility, we recommend increased use of 
rotational programs between government, academia, and industry; as well as the use of 
incentives for government civilian personnel to deploy overseas during contingency 
operations. 
 
Provide rotational programs between Government, academia, and industry. 
Rotational programs can inject new perspectives into the acquisition environment and 
should be greatly expanded.  While there currently is an Acquisition Exchange Program 
at DoD, its size and scope should be broadened significantly to include a new emphasis 
on rotations outside of DoD, with academia and industry, in addition to rotations within 
the Federal government.  We believe the introduction of a rotational program for 
acquisition personnel would be highly beneficial, for increasing and enriching the 
knowledge and experience of DoD’s acquisition workforce, as well as encouraging 
information sharing and the introduction of new perspectives.  For example, DoD 
personnel who gain experience in the private sector, through a rotation, can then bring 
that knowledge back into DoD.  Such knowledge can permit DoD to more aptly 
capitalize on commercial best-practices that may otherwise remain unknown.  
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Rotational programs also provide an incentive for attracting, for recruiting, training and 
hiring high caliber entry and mid-level employees.  Internal rotational programs have 
been immensely successful when implemented by other Federal departments, such as the 
Department of the Interior and the Department of Veterans Affairs (FAI, 2008).  There is 
every reason to believe that external rotational programs would have similar, if not 
greater, impacts.  It should also be noted that the benefit of rotational programs do not 
simply serve potential new hires, but also older and more experienced employees as well.  
In addition to reducing the potential for employee turnover, by keeping jobs both 
interesting and challenging for long-time employees, rotational programs can also permit 
the development of new skills for these employees and assist in overcoming the current 
experience gap which exists within certain sectors of the workforce.  
 
Finally, the DoD should make greater use of the potential of bringing in mid-level and 
senior-level industry people (with the needed critical skills) for term assignments (e.g. a 
three year rotation, outside of the civil service system).  This approach has been used 
very successfully in the past (e.g. through a program covered by Public Law 80-313) and 
is currently provided in limited numbers for selected positions (e.g. positions in 
DARPA). Conflicts-of-interest can be explicitly avoided, and it can be a win-win-win 
situation—benefiting the government, with experienced people; the company, when the 
employee returns with an understanding of how government works; and the employee, 
with a greatly-broadening experience. 
 
Eliminate disincentives to deploy. 
An additional factor that must be addressed to enhance workforce agility is the inherent 
disincentive for civilian acquisition workforce members to deploy overseas in 
contingency environments.  Obviously, conditions in a warzone are not ideal for 
members of the civilian workforce.  However, because these personnel may be required 
to carry out important functions on-site, DoD must take the appropriate steps to 
effectively recruit these personnel to volunteer for deployment during wartime in order to 
support contingency operations.  A first step would be to provide additional financial 
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incentives, including an equivalent to Hazardous Duty Pay (HDP) for deployed civilian 
acquisition personnel.  As defined by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service 
(DFAS), HDP permits up to 25 percent additional pay to GS employees who are 
performing hazardous duty which could result in serious injury, or death or duty that 
requires experiencing physical hardship that could cause extreme physical discomfort or 
distress (Defense Finance and Accounting Service, 2009).  This definition should be 
expanded to include a provision for GS employees operating in a war-zone.  Furthermore, 
income earned by GS employees during deployment should also be given the same “tax 
free” earning benefits as military service members currently receive; and any so-called 
“pay cap” restrictions must be removed (Commission on Army Acquisition and Program 
Management in Expeditionary Operations, 2007). 
 
Additional important changes must also be made with respect to policies regarding 
supplemental life insurance and long-term care insurance coverage for civilian workforce 
members who are deployed.  Because most standard life insurance policies have clauses 
that exclude “acts of war” as a coverable cause of death, civilian employees must receive 
some type of supplemental insurance specifically designed to cover potential deaths that 
could occur during a deployment.  With respect to long-term care, while injuries 
sustained during deployments are covered, any needed long-term care, once a civilian 
returns home, is excluded.  Civilians who are injured while in-theater should receive the 
same long-term care benefits as active duty-military personnel.  Such “piece of mind” 
may be the determining factor for civilian employees who decide to take on the additional 
risk of working in a war-zone (Commission on Army Acquisition and Program 
Management in Expeditionary Operations, 2007).   
 
Finally, some type of pre-deployment training should be provided, to permit civilians to 
effectively prepare and acclimate themselves to the situation on the ground in the 
contingency environment.  Not only will such training improve readiness, but it will also 
provide confidence and reassure those members of the acquisition workforce, who are to 
be deployed, that they have the basic skills and knowledge needed to function within a 
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war-zone.  Provision of this training could make deployed civilians feel more prepared to 
go overseas and reduce their hesitancy to volunteer. 
Adapt to blended workforce and partnering environment. 
 
The blended workforce and government/industry partnering environment has created 
unique management challenges for DoD’s acquisition workforce.  In order to successfully 
adapt to this environment, we believe DoD must: 1. identify inherently governmental 
functions; 2. identify any critical positions that need to be performed by DoD personnel; 
and, 3. develop approaches to eliminate organizational and personal conflicts-of-interest. 
 
Identify “inherently governmental” functions. 
While DoD and other agencies within the Federal government have developed guidance 
for identifying “inherently governmental” functions, it is generally fairly broad; and, as a 
result, it is often inconsistently interpreted.  We believe clear guidance must be provided 
to departments and agencies so they can unambiguously identify those individuals 
performing the narrow band of work that is truly “inherently governmental.”15  That work 
must be performed by either military or DoD civilian employees.  Other tasks can be 
considered for contractor support.  The Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB), 
Office of Federal Procurement Policy, recently released draft memo is a beginning to 
creating new guidance for those functions which are to be considered “inherently 
governmental”, but may still be overly broad.  We believe further examination of these 
definitions, and the implications of their adoption, should be undertaken within DoD.  
 
Identify “critical positions” that need to be performed by government personnel. 
In addition to the establishment of a clear line between what is “inherently governmental” 
and what is suitable for contracting out, a clear distinction must also be made for support 
functions that are required to directly assist those carrying out “inherently governmental” 
                                                 
15 Currently, the Office of Management and Budget, Office of Federal Procurement Policy is working on 
new guidelines to define three categories of work: inherently governmental, closely associated with 
inherently governmental and critical functions.  As of the date of this report a draft memo of these 
definitions was issued in the Federal Register: March 31, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 61).  However, they 
are very broad, and unnecessarily easy to make overly restrictive over private sector employment. 
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tasks.  More specifically, while certain “critical positions” may not be considered 
“inherently governmental,” it may be beneficial for DoD employees to complete these 
tasks, particularly for that small number of experts providing critical evaluations and 
advice on issues driving contractor-supported programs.  Therefore, DoD should identify 
those positions, and ensure they are filled by qualified military or DoD civilians.  As 
noted previously, the recent draft memo released by the Office of Federal Procurement 
Policy is a good beginning to clearly define those “critical positions” which must be 
performed by government personnel.  We believe examination of these definitions and 
the impact of their implantation throughout DoD should be evaluated carefully, as there 
truly are only a minimum of them. 
Develop approaches to eliminate organizational and personal conflicts-of-interest. 
Finally, we also believe that to successfully modernize the acquisition workforce for the 
twenty-first century, conflicts-of-interest must be reduced to the maximum extent 
possible.  Members of the acquisition workforce should utilize contractors for 
maximization of efficiency only in areas that will not contribute to organizational 
conflicts-of-interest.  This is increasingly difficult, since vertical integration within the 
defense industry has greatly reduced the number of firms that are not a part of a major 
developer/integrator.  New approaches, such as using companies not part of the historical 
defense contracting community, or the creative use of limited liability companies (LLC) 
and/or proxy structures (to create independent entities that can provide a service) must be 
implemented; and the existence of independent firms (e.g. those providing support to 
program offices, and/or doing architecture and systems engineering or systems-of-
systems) should be encouraged.   
 
Moreover, since contractors can potentially have significant influence over many 
government program decisions, those individuals should be subject to the same personal 
conflict-of-interest policy as government employees.  These should cover areas such as: 
their stock holdings, spouse employment, and gifts.  DoD should develop a consistent 
policy for contractors regarding personal conflicts-of-interest, and then require the 




In the second decade of the twenty-first century, the United States will face a diverse set 
of trials that include a prolonged economic recession, significant budget deficits, global 
warming, escalating health-care costs, the need for education reform, and threats to 
homeland security.  And, with the interconnected global environment, new challenges 
will continue to emerge suddenly and unexpectedly—as highlighted by the continued 
terrorist threat and recent “swine flu” pandemic.  At the same time, the United States is 
also struggling to transform and modernize its military forces, so it can effectively 
provide the capabilities required for the future national security environment.  One key 
factor in transformation of the U.S. military, for the twenty-first century, is its acquisition 
workforce.  In its current state, however, DoD’s acquisition workforce is not adequately 
structured to meet modern demands.   
 
To meet these requirements, we believe DoD should center its efforts on creating “Smart 
Buyers”, who have the skills and experiences to successfully support defense acquisition 
in the twenty-first century.  This must be viewed as one of DoD’s top priorities—the 
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